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GUARDING THE GUARDIANS:
THE CASE FOR REGULATING STATE-OWNED
FINANCIAL ENTITIES IN GLOBAL FINANCE
Stephen Kim Park*
Amidst the expansion of cross-border financial regulation, conspicuously
missing from recent scholarly inquiries is the question of how institutions
owned and controlled by governments, such as central banks, international
financial institutions, and sovereign wealth funds, should be regulated in their
capacities as market participants. The growth of these state-owned financial
entities, coupled with the integral role of domestic and supranational regulators
in promulgating, monitoring, and enforcing international financial rules,
highlights a reversal of roles in the traditional regulatory framework—when
governments as regulators become regulated subjects. This Article considers
the legal and policy implications of this phenomenon by examining the
application of the competing legal doctrines that govern this dynamic:
extraterritorial application of domestic regulation versus the privileges and
immunities under international law afforded to entities owned by a foreign
government or multiple governments. The relative dearth of bright-line rules
and the opaque nature of coordination mechanisms provide flexibility to
regulators seeking to determine how to treat state-owned financial entities, but
may also undermine the legitimacy of global financial regulation. As a case
study, this Article examines the regulation of international financial institutions
under the Dodd-Frank Act. To address the functional and normative
shortcomings of the international financial architecture, I outline a global
governance framework based on international comity to address the unique
and wide-ranging implications of governments in the market.
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INTRODUCTION
Among the many lessons learned in the aftermath of the recent
financial crisis is the challenge of managing the globalization of financial
markets. A wave of regulatory reforms across the globe has grappled with
the effects of cross-border financial activities conducted by banks, funds,
and other international pools of capital. Governments, acting alone and in
coordination with their regulatory counterparts in other countries, may
exercise this authority by applying domestic law to foreign firms and to
such firms’ cross-border and offshore activities. The convergence of these
distinct yet inevitably intertwined phenomena—the rising volume of global
capital flows and the desire to regulate foreign entities and activities—has
weighty implications for the future of international law and the
management of the global economy.
These developments have not come without controversy. The
projection of domestic regulatory authority abroad raises normative and
doctrinal questions about the future of national sovereignty in a global legal
order in which private actors may be subject to the jurisdiction of multiple
governmental authorities. This profoundly far-reaching debate, which has
occupied scholars and practitioners alike for decades in areas such as
corporate social responsibility, international human rights, and international
trade regulation, has a newfound urgency due to the sheer size and
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magnitude of global financial markets and their spillover effects on the rest
of the international economy.1 Scholarly inquiry about its value, purpose,
and proper scope may help clarify the legal mandates of domestic
regulators and the strategic planning of financial institutions that function
in this increasingly diverse and uncertain regulatory environment.
This Article identifies and explores an overlooked dimension in this
debate: the status of market participants that are owned and/or controlled
by the state. States participate in global financial markets alongside private
actors. Indeed, the past few decades have witnessed the emergence and
growth of market participants of an inherently public, governmental
nature—among which include government agencies (such as finance
ministries), central banks, and sovereign wealth funds, as well as
international financial institutions such as the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund (IMF) that are owned and governed by their member
states.2 These sovereign and supranational entities engage in a wide range
of cross-border financial transactions with each other and private
counterparties, including issuing debt, entering into derivative transactions,
and investing in equities.
Despite the prominence of state-owned financial entities in the U.S.
and foreign financial markets, their regulation has been, by and large,
addressed in an ad hoc, piecemeal manner that reflects the absence of any
kind of settled practice or binding legal principle. One reason is due to
uncertainty about the extent to which privileges and immunities under
international law apply to the market-based activities of these unique
governmental entities. The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that
one state is not subject to the full force of rules applicable in another state.
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Connecticut School of Business.
Many thanks to family, friends, and colleagues for feedback and support. I wish to
acknowledge the helpful insights of Chris Brummer, John Scott, and participants at the 2012
ALSB Annual Conference and the 2013 Philadelphia JILSA workshop. I also wish to thank
the editors and staff of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law for their
assistance. The views expressed in this Article and any errors and omissions are mine
alone.
1. See, e.g., David J. Bederman, Diversity and Permeability in Transnational
Governance, 57 EMORY L.J. 201 (2007) (globalizing developments in the transnational legal
order); Austen L. Parrish, Rehabilitating Territoriality in Human Rights, 32 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1099 (2011) (globalization and territorial governance in international human rights);
Chantal Thomas, Should the World Trade Organization Incorporate Labor and
Environmental Standards?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (2004) (enforcement mechanisms in
international trade law); Jonathan Turley, “When in Rome”: Multinational Misconduct and
the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598 (1990) (extraterritorial
jurisdiction and statutory interpretation).
2. This Article refers to these entities collectively as “state-owned financial entities.”
This Article does not directly address state-owned banks and other state-owned enterprises
whose missions and activities are generally not public in nature.
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Similarly, the distinct yet related doctrine granting privileges and
immunities to international organizations is well established in
international law.3 Nonetheless, as this Article shows, these doctrines are
rife with ambiguity in practice due to the lack of clarity regarding the
balancing of the sovereign prerogatives underlying regulatory authority and
regulatory immunity.4 International privileges and immunities—whether
expressly cited or implicitly relied on—have an effect on the level and kind
of regulatory authority to which foreign state-owned financial entities may
be subject. In the United States, this phenomenon has been notably evident
in ongoing administrative rulemaking pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act.5
The unsettled status quo underscores the potential for policy incoherence
arising from discord between centuries-old principles of international law
and the Bretton Woods-era international economic system vis-à-vis the
rapidly-changing nature and scope of modern-day international finance.
International law—and the traditional framework of regulatory
authority on which it is based—is premised on a command-and-control
relationship between governments as regulators and private market
participants as their regulated subjects. The juxtaposition of international
privileges and immunities with extraterritorial regulation of foreign
sovereign and supranational entities exposes disjunctures in this
relationship. The consequences of inaction, albeit indirect, may be severe.
Governance gaps may form if conflicts between these principles are
resolved differently across jurisdictions, or there may be legal instability
over time as regulators struggle to harmonize these principles to new kinds
of state-owned financial entities and new kinds of financial activities.
Perhaps the most troubling implication is the possibility of collective doubt
among private market participants about the fundamental fairness of
international privileges and immunities, which may damage the legitimacy
of global financial regulation itself.
On a broader conceptual plane, global financial regulation reflects the
changing environment of international business, in which private actors
engage with each other as well as with states to proscribe standards of
3. This Article analyzes individually the privilege and immunity doctrines applicable
to foreign governments and their instrumentalities and enterprises (hereinafter referred to as
“sovereign immunity”) and to international organizations (hereinafter referred to as
“intergovernmental immunity”), and collectively refers to these doctrines as they may apply
to either or both types of state-owned financial entities as “international privileges and
immunities.”
4. The concept of “regulatory immunity,” as presented in this Article, describes the
application of international privileges and immunities to regulatory authority exercised visà-vis a foreign government or an international organization.
5. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].

PARK_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

GUARDING THE GUARDIANS

6/3/14 10:06 AM

743

conduct.6 As a means of mediating the conflicts and concerns raised by the
extraterritorial regulation of state-owned financial entities, this Article
looks towards these new forms of global governance.
While
acknowledging their limitations, this Article suggests a framework based
on coordinated standard-setting, mutual recognition, and interagency
dialogue.
This Article explores these issues in three parts. Part I provides a brief
overview of the extraterritorial dimensions of recent financial regulatory
reforms, with a specific focus on the Dodd-Frank Act. As a means of
evaluating the process and effects of global financial regulation, the
doctrinal and institutional tools of extraterritorial regulatory authority are
identified and examined. Drawing on recent scholarly insights in
international economic law, traditional government-centric conceptions of
domestic regulatory authority are compared to hybrid approaches that
incorporate transgovernmental regulatory networks, international financial
institutions, and non-state actors. Part II begins by describing the sizable
and evolving role of state-owned financial entities as market participants in
global financial markets. The cross-border financial transactions of these
institutions reveal potential stress points in global financial regulation due
to their unique status as sovereign and supranational entities. Part II
proceeds by exploring the privileges and immunities enjoyed by these
actors under international law, and then considers how claims of regulatory
immunity may complicate the formulation and enforcement of global
financial rules. The experience of international financial institutions in
respect of the provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act regulating swap
transactions is examined as an illuminating case study. Part III explores the
ramifications of this inversion of the roles of the regulator and the
regulated, identifying the systemic concerns that this phenomenon raises.
Drawing on insights and critiques raised by scholarship on network theory,
legal pluralism, and social constructivism, Part III outlines a framework of
global financial comity as a means of facilitating the identification,
expression, and resolution of institutional conflicts. These prescriptive
measures, although in part a reflection of the unique status of state-owned
financial entities, also reveal the extent to which questions of accountability
and legitimacy permeate the governance of international business activities
generally. In the Conclusion, I suggest ways in which the insights offered

6. This Article uses the term “global financial regulation” to refer to the regulation of
foreign and transnational entities and cross-border financial activities, irrespective of its
source or mode. The extraterritorial application of domestic financial rules by individual
governments—most notably, the United States—is thereby linked with the distinct,
relatively nascent area of financial regulation based on informal rules and regulatory
coordination among multiple governments. See infra Part I.B.2.
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in this Article may be more broadly applied to issues of financial
regulation, global governance, and the future development of international
law.
I.

EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND THE STATE: THE EXPANDING REACH OF
FINANCIAL REGULATION

Global financial regulation underscores the changing nature of state
power. Economic globalization has transformed the means by which
sovereignty is exercised and therefore the exercise of regulatory authority.
The following discussion describes this evolving movement in the context
of global financial regulation, which features the extraterritorial exercise of
domestic regulatory authority coupled with the proliferation of
transnational networks of regulators.
A.

The Objectives and Limitations of Global Financial Regulation

The 2008 financial crisis revealed the extent to which financial actors,
markets, and activities have moved offshore, beyond the territorial reach of
domestic regulators. Although the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis that was
its root cause was not inherently global in nature, the near-collapse of the
world’s financial system demonstrated the interconnectedness of global
financial markets and the shortcomings of regulatory approaches to
maintain stability and mitigate systemic risk.7 Without a doubt, the
financial crisis, reflecting the globalization of financial markets in the
twenty-first century, was global in scope and effect.8
Globalization has increased both the breadth and depth of modern
finance—the scope of cross-border financial activities is enormous and
unprecedented.9 In 2012, the size of international positions of banks was
over U.S. $33 trillion, and the total amount outstanding of international

7. See Douglas W. Arner, Adaptation and Resilience in Global Financial Regulation,
89 N.C. L. REV. 1579, 1582-86 (2011) (providing a framework for analyzing systemic risk
in the global financial system). Systemic risk, the avoidance of which is oft-cited as a key
function of financial regulation, has three meanings: (1) the correlated exposure of
institutions and markets to external shock; (2) the potential for a chain reaction of failures
due to the interconnectedness of institutions through counterparty relationships; and (3) the
problem of contagion due to the spread of failures (or the fear of failures) across different
industries or sectors. HAL S. SCOTT, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 11-12 (2009).
8. See Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It
Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257, 268 (2011) (describing “global” systemic risk).
9. See HAL S. SCOTT & ANNA GELPERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS,
POLICY, AND REGULATION 18-21 (19th ed. 2012) (analyzing the globalization of financial
markets based on several metrics).

PARK_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

GUARDING THE GUARDIANS

6/3/14 10:06 AM

745

debt securities was approximately U.S. $21.6 trillion.10 The nominal value
of derivative contracts is staggering, amounting to U.S. $639 trillion in
notional amounts outstanding and U.S. $25 trillion in gross market value.11
In the United States, foreign entities (among which may include
corporations, banks and other financial institutions, and governments) issue
securities in the U.S. capital markets, which may be listed on a U.S. stock
exchange or sold directly to U.S. purchasers under certain conditions.12
Foreign banks may operate in the United States, either on a cross-border
basis or through the establishment of domestic branches or subsidiaries.13
Most notably, the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market—which was
largely self-regulated in the United States prior to the Dodd-Frank Act—
has been traditionally based on bilateral contracts between counterparties
that may be domiciled anywhere.14
The regulation of global finance consists of two distinct types of
governmental engagement: rulemaking and standard-setting, on the one
hand, and prudential oversight and supervision, on the other.15 Supervisory
authority is further sub-categorized into traditional prudential supervision,
which concerns the safety and soundness of individual financial entities,
and macroprudential supervision, which addresses the stability of the entire
financial system.16 The risks resulting from regulatory gaps caused by
antiquated domestic regimes and inadequate international coordination
were exposed in unprecedented ways during the financial crisis and its
aftermath.17 The Dodd-Frank Act can be viewed as a direct response.18

10. Bank of International Settlements, BIS Quarterly Review, Statistical Annex (Dec.
10, 2012), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qs1212.pdf.
11. Bank of International Settlements, BIS Quarterly Review, Highlights of the BIS
International
Statistics
(Dec.
10,
2012),
available
at
http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1212b.pdf. Derivatives—such as futures, options, and
swaps—are financial instruments whose value is based on or derived from other assets or
variables. The underlying asset may be anything from stock and bonds, to commodities,
interest rates, currency rates, or a stock market index. Seema G. Sharma, Over-the-Counter
Derivatives: A New Era of Financial Regulation, 17 LAW & BUS. REV. 279, 283-84 (2011).
12. SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 9, at 91-93.
13. MICHAEL P. MALLOY, PRINCIPLES OF BANK REGULATION 395-400 (3d ed. 2011).
14. Arner, supra note 7, at 1584-85, 1602; Frank Partnoy, The Shifting Contours of
Global Derivatives Regulation, 22 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 421, 422 (2001) (referring to the
absence of regulation of many classes of derivatives).
15. See Eric J. Pan, Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in
Financial Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental Networks, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 243, 264
(2010) (noting the distinction between rulemaking and supervision). Supervision is the
process by which regulators monitor the behavior of financial institutions and other market
participants to ensure compliance with applicable rules and standards. Id. at 265-66.
16. Arner, supra note 7, at 1583-84.
17. See id. at 1610-11 (arguing that opportunities for regulatory avoidance and
arbitrage, as well as a lack of transparency of complex global financial institutions, were a
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Perhaps not surprisingly, given the global scope of the financial
activities that regulators around the world have sought to address,
appraisals of the Dodd-Frank Act evoke fundamental questions about the
objectives and effectiveness of the state as regulator. According to certain
impassioned observers, economic globalization has hastened the decline
and eventual obsolescence of the modern Westphalian nation-state
system.19 Others cite the lack of a centralized enforcement authority as
evidence of the collective action problems among sovereigns that have
beset the nation-state system for centuries.20 The fragmented nature of
global financial regulation may also reflect the influence of private
financial entities in rulemaking and standard-setting based on their narrow,
self-interested objectives.21 In this respect, the regulation of global finance
may present unique challenges to state authority because of the
unparalleled mobility of portfolio capital, deeply intertwined relationships
between governments and their respective countries’ banking sectors, and
the consequential effect of risk across many distinct yet inter-connected
counterparties.22 Due to the predominantly territorial basis for regulatory
authority in financial services, foreign entities may be subject to varying
levels of regulatory oversight depending on the nature of their transactions,
their domicile, or other factors, which may give rise to regulatory arbitrage

result of the structure of domestic, regional, and international regulation before the global
financial crisis).
18. See Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 YALE J. ON
REG. 91, 97-108 (2012) (explaining how the Dodd-Frank Act improved management of
systematic risk).
19. See, e.g., THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING
GLOBALIZATION (1999) (suggesting that globalization has created a single global market that
integrates capital, technology, and information across nations); see also Larry Catá Backer,
Economic Globalization Ascendant and the Crisis of the State: Four Perspectives on the
Emerging Ideology of the State in the New Global Order, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 141,
145-54 (2006) (describing one perspective of the state as increasingly dependent on nonstate actors for power).
20. See David Zaring, Finding Legal Principle in Global Financial Regulation, 52 VA.
J. INT’L L. 683, 701-16 (2012) (identifying shared and comparable characteristics of
international financial law and the treaty-based hard international law regimes of the WTO
and the EU).
21. See Michael Greenberger, The Extraterritorial Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
Protects U.S. Taxpayers from Worldwide Bailouts, 80 UMKC L. REV. 1, 18-21 (2012)
(arguing that the ineffectiveness and slow pace of foreign and international regulatory
reform of OTC derivative markets warrants immediate, unilateral action by U.S. regulators).
22. See DANIEL W. DREZNER, ALL POLITICS IS GLOBAL 130-32 (2007) (describing the
causes of inadequate regulation following the Latin American and East Asian financial
crises of the 1990s); Joel P. Trachtman, The International Law of Financial Crisis:
Spillovers, Subsidiarity, Fragmentation and Cooperation, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 719, 723
(2010) (describing the effects of regulatory competition on regulatory effectiveness).
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and the so-called race to the bottom.23 State regulatory power may be
uniquely hampered in respect of foreign financial actors and their activities
due to the latter’s ability to move across borders.24
During the financial crisis, the absence of a global financial regulator
with enforcement powers akin to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
was glaring.25 As a response, there have been renewed calls for the
establishment of a treaty-based international regime of varying substantive
scope and institutionalization.26 The appeal of an intergovernmental body
with lawmaking, monitoring, and coercive enforcement powers over
financial activities is manifold.27 Nonetheless, despite the shortcomings of
the status quo and a desire to realize the broad aspirations of a post-Bretton
Woods order, a global financial regulator appears highly unlikely for the
foreseeable future. Among other factors, this is due to the benefits that
governments accrue by retaining rulemaking and supervisory autonomy:
namely, the prerogative to selectively apply or change policies and
practices based on national interest, which may include the preferences of
domestic financial interests and firms.28 In any event, it is indisputable that
23. See Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory
Competition, 52 EMORY L.J. 1353, 1362 (2003) (defining regulatory arbitrage as the
movement of market competitors to jurisdictions that are unregulated, lightly regulated, or
otherwise have relatively favorable regulations); see also Trachtman, supra note 22, at 742
(describing a global “race to inappropriate laxity”).
24. See Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CAL. L. REV. 327,
379 (2010).
25. See Thomas Cottier, Challenges Ahead in International Economic Law, 12 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 3, 14 (2009) (observing, inter alia, that the financial crisis showed that state-based
regimes were wholly inadequate).
26. See, e.g., DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODDFRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 186-87 (2011) (proposing an
international treaty to govern the insolvency of financial institutions under the laws of the
six most important countries); Barry Eichengreen, Not a New Bretton Woods but a New
Bretton Woods Process, in WHAT G20 LEADERS MUST DO TO STABILISE OUR ECONOMY AND
FIX THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 25, 25-27 (Barry Eichengreen & Richard Baldwin eds., 2008),
available at http://www.voxeu.org/sites/default/files/file/G20_Summit%20vox.pdf (calling
for the creation of a World Financial Organization equivalent to the WTO with a broad
rulemaking and supervisory mandate); Edward F. Greene & Joshua L. Boehm, The Limits of
“Name-and-Shame” in International Financial Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1083,
1130-33 (2012) (proposing a treaty-based framework for coordinating supervision and
resolution of global systemically important financial institutions); Pan, supra note 15, at
273-77 (advocating for the creation of an international body responsible for cross-border
supervision).
27. See Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance—And Not
Trade, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 623, 641 (2010) (noting the structural flaws and shortcomings of
soft law based global financial regulation in comparison to the enforcement powers of the
WTO).
28. See CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE
MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 269 (2011) (discussing the impracticability of having a single
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the negotiation of an international treaty-based framework would be long
and arduous due to the persistence of nationalistic and protectionist
sentiments.29
B.

Extraterritoriality as an Instrument of Regulatory Power

In light of newfound pressures on states arising from the globalization
of finance, extraterritorial regulation offers various means to manage the
activities of foreign financial institutions. The following discussion
identifies and analyzes these approaches, and explores the concerns that are
implicated by extraterritoriality. This overview is deliberately nonexhaustive, focusing on areas and issues of most relevance to state-owned
financial entities.
1. How and To What Effect Extraterritorial Regulation is Exercised
A cornerstone of the international legal system is territoriality, based
on the idea that each sovereign state has exclusive jurisdiction over its own
territory.30 Domestic territoriality both reflects and furthers the principle of
sovereignty by circumscribing the reach of state authority while reinforcing
the absolute power of every state within its own borders.31 In accordance
with this principle, U.S. financial law embraces the presumption that a
country’s laws apply only to acts or events occurring within its territory.32
One of the most profound changes in international relations has been
the rise of extraterritoriality, or the extension of domestic law to activity
outside of the country’s territory.33 In particular, the growing use of U.S.
global financial regulator).
29. See Eric C. Chaffee, The Internationalization of Securities Regulation: The United
States Government’s Role in Regulating the Capital Markets, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 187, 197
(2010) (suggesting that despite the potential benefits of global regulatory harmonization of
securities regulation, such process would be slow and evolutionary). This was arguably
evident in the area of international trade regulation by the nearly five decades between the
signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the establishment of
the WTO. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 35-44 (2d ed. 1997) (explaining the flawed
constitutional beginnings of the GATT).
30. See Parrish, supra note 1, at 1100-01.
31. Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction:
Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 121,
127 (2007).
32. See BRUMMER, supra note 28, at 33-35.
33. See Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93
MINN. L. REV. 815, 841-56 (2009) (describing the displacement of treaty-based international
law by transnational law).
Under international law, territorial jurisdiction includes subjective and objective
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domestic law to regulate conduct occurring beyond U.S. borders has been
at the forefront of this wave. Transnational civil litigation in U.S. federal
courts has been used to exert influence via judicial enforcement in a wide
range of subject areas.34 Through a variety of administrative agency
rulemaking and enforcement mechanisms, the United States, more than any
other country, has projected its regulatory authority extraterritorially.35
Mirroring these broad-based changes in other areas of global import,
foreign financial institutions and offshore financial activities are
increasingly governed by a web of domestic legal rules projected across
national borders. In the United States, federal regulatory authorities—such
as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and the Federal Reserve—supervise
and proscribe certain conduct of foreign entities and offshore activities.
Extraterritorial regulatory authority is exercised in a variety of distinct
ways, reflecting a diverse array of public policy considerations.36
Extraterritorial regulation falls into the following four categories, with
illustrative examples from U.S. financial law and practice:
TARGETED FOREIGN REGULATION. Foreign entities may be subject to
laws and/or administrative regulations directly and exclusively applied to
them. This sort of blunt force approach is relatively rare and applied
narrowly in global financial regulation due to its blatantly discriminatory
nature.37 Although this form of extraterritorial regulation is most

forms. Subjective territoriality provides a nation-state with jurisdiction over acts that occur
within its territory that may have effects outside its territory. Objective territoriality—
otherwise known as the “effects doctrine”—concerns conduct that occurs outside the nationstate that has, or is intended to have, effect within its territory. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1) (1987); PETER MALANCZUK,
AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 110-11 (7th ed. 1997)
[hereinafter Akehurst]. As further examined herein, the extrapolation of these principles is
prevalent in the extraterritorial application of U.S. financial regulation.
34. See Parrish, supra note 33, at 846-49 (describing and citing the use of
extraterritorial domestic law in antitrust, securities regulation, intellectual property law,
corporate law, bankruptcy, tax, criminal law, environmental law, civil rights, and labor); see
also Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 251, 27380 (2006) (critiquing the application of territorial principles in transnational regulatory
cases).
35. See BRUMMER, supra note 28, at 44-45 (referring to U.S. regulatory dominance as
most closely resembling lex financiera).
36. The overview of extraterritorial regulation that follows draws substantially from
Chris Brummer’s description of regulatory strategies based on extraterritorial territoriality
and direct extraterritoriality. See Chris Brummer, Territoriality as a Regulatory Technique:
Notes from the Financial Crisis, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 499, 504-09 (2010) (describing the
various regulatory tactics asserted under territorial authority).
37. See id. at 507 (noting that this form of extraterritorial regulation is “virtually non-
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commonly associated with laws pertaining to international human rights
laws, such as the Alien Tort Statute, it does intersect the financial sector
with respect to entities and activities of a nature that implicate national
security interests. For example, sanctions under U.S. law may be enforced
against foreign central banks and other financial institutions wholly or
partly owned by foreign governments that prevent such entities from
transacting with American counterparties.38 Also, the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an inter-agency
committee that is authorized to review foreign investment with national
security implications, may block acquisitions of U.S. businesses by foreign
persons.39 A third example, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),
imposes civil liability and criminal sanctions on U.S. persons and certain
foreign parties for bribery of foreign government officials, which may
include representatives and agents of state-owned financial entities.40
QUASI-TERRITORIAL REGULATION. Foreign entities operating in the
United States through affiliates, subsidiaries, and other instrumentalities are
invariably subject to supervision and operational requirements by U.S.
regulators, both at the federal and often state levels. Extraterritorial
regulation of domestic financial activities by domestically-domiciled
existent” in the financial world due to the reluctance of courts to take on cases with little
national security interest).
38. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), an agency within the Department of
the Treasury, administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions against targeted
foreign countries, regimes, and other threats to the national security, foreign policy, or
economy of the United States. OFAC has the authority to impose controls on transactions
and freeze assets under U.S. jurisdiction. For example, OFAC prohibits U.S. depository
institutions, including foreign branches, from servicing accounts of the government of Iran,
including Iranian government-owned or -controlled banks. See Iranian Transactions
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 560 (2012) (detailing the prohibition of supplying various types of
goods and services to Iran, as well as defining the scope of the prohibition).
39. See Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1971-1975) (ordering the establishment
of CFIUS and establishing its responsibilities and authority).
40. See DEPT. OF JUST. AND SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S.
FOREIGN
CORRUPT
PRACTICES
ACT
(2012),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf.
The FCPA neither specifically
addresses nor excludes financial transactions or institutions, either as subjects or objects of
prohibited conduct. Nonetheless, it is plausible that aggressive FCPA enforcement may
have a material negative effect on the financial activities of foreign state-owned financial
entities that engage with counterparties subject to the FCPA. See Brummer, supra note 36,
at 507 (identifying the FCPA as an exception to the reluctance of courts to adjudicate
extraterritoriality cases in the financial sector); see also Joshua Gallu, SEC Probes Financial
Firms on Sovereign Fund Bribes, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 14, 2011,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/pring/2011001-14/sec-probes-financial-firms-on-possiblebribes-to-sovereign-wealth-funds.html (highlighting FCPA enforcement in respect of
sovereign wealth funds).
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foreign entities is particularly evident in two important areas of global
financial regulation. First, among the banking reforms promulgated by the
Dodd-Frank Act are heightened prudential standards and financial
institution resolution arrangements for systemically important financial
institutions.41 Foreign banks may be directly subject to the Dodd-Frank
Act’s supervision and resolution requirements on the basis of their
capitalization, notwithstanding their compliance with standards in their
home jurisdictions.42 Second, with respect to OTC derivatives trading, the
possibility of quasi-territorial regulation has arisen most tellingly in the
context of the definition of a “U.S. person” under the Dodd-Frank Act.
Foreign financial institutions and other foreign market participants may be
subject to derivatives rules through quasi-territorial regulation if their U.S.domiciled operations are considered to be U.S. persons.43 What makes this
41. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 165-166, 204(a).
42. To cite a prominent example, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
has the authority to require a foreign bank with a U.S. presence to submit a resolution plan
(commonly referred to as a “living will”), which outlines the liquidation to which it would
be subject in the event of a failure. See Greenberger, supra note 21, at 5 (commenting on
the FDIC’s proposed rules to require living wills); see also Greene & Boehm, supra note 26,
at 1104-05 (noting the potential conflicts between recovery and resolution planning
regulations promulgated pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act and international regulatory
harmonization for multinational financial institutions).
43. The CFTC has defined a “U.S. person” as:
(i) Any natural person who is a resident of the U.S.; (ii) any corporation,
partnership, LLC, business or other trust, association, joint-stock company,
fund, or any form of enterprise similar to any of the forgoing that is either: (A)
organized or incorporated under the laws of the U.S. or has its principal place of
business in the U.S., (“legal entity”) or (B) in which the direct or indirect
owners thereof are responsible for the liabilities of such entity and one or more
of such owners is a U.S. person; (iii) any individual account (discretionary or
not) where the beneficial owner is a U.S. person; (iv) any commodity pool,
pooled account, or collective investment vehicle (whether or not it is organized
or incorporated in the U.S.) of which a majority ownership is held, directly or
indirectly, by a U.S. person(s); (v) any commodity pool, pooled account, or
collective investment vehicle the operator of which would be required to
register as a commodity pool operator under the [Commodity Exchange Act];
(vi) a pension plan for the employees, officers, or principals of a legal entity
with its principal place of business inside the United States; and (vii) an estate
or trust, the income of which is subject to U.S. income tax, regardless of source.
Cross-Border Application of Certain Swaps Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, 77
Fed. Reg. 41,214, 41,218 (proposed July 12, 2012). This definition continues to be subject
to administrative review and potential modification. See Exemptive Order Regarding
Compliance With Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 43,785 (July 22, 2013)
(temporarily delaying implementation of new rules governing swaps under the Dodd-Frank
Act).
Conversely, foreign affiliates or agencies of U.S.-based institutions, such as a
foreign branch of a U.S. bank, may fall under the definition of U.S. person, and therefore be
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mode of regulation profoundly powerful is the cross-border diffusion of
national rules and standards within vertically-integrated multinational
financial institutions.44 Among the foreign market participants that may be
subject to these sorts of compliance costs are international financial
institutions and sovereign wealth funds.45
EFFECTS-BASED REGULATION. Foreign entities may be subject to
regulation for financial activities that have effects in the United States.
Effects-based regulation follows the objective, or “protect[ive],” view of
territoriality, based on the premise that the U.S. market and investors
should be protected from foreign misconduct.46 Extraterritoriality disputes
have arisen prominently with respect to the antifraud provisions of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act).47 For nearly fifty
years, foreign plaintiffs relied on the extraterritorial application of Rule
10b-5 (promulgated pursuant to Section 10b of the Exchange Act) to file
so-called “foreign-cubed” securities fraud suits against foreign defendants,
alleging fraud in connection with a sale or purchase of securities in foreign
markets.48 In June 2010, the Supreme Court set aside the “effects” test for
subject to the Dodd-Frank Act’s derivatives rules. See 78 Fed. Reg. at 43,786, 43,789-90
(July 22, 2013) (addressing the centralized clearing of swaps required by the Dodd-Frank
Act and the applicability of this rule to foreign branches).
44. The “upstream[ing]” of territorially applied regulatory rules from a local subsidiary
to a foreign-domiciled parent company and its international affiliates may be attributable to
a manager’s desire to reduce compliance and other transaction costs. Brummer, supra note
36, at 504-05. Due to differences between the Dodd-Frank Act and non-U.S. regulatory
regimes, there is the possibility of foreign entities being subject to overlapping, conflicting,
or otherwise incongruent regulations. See Christian A. Johnson, Regulatory Arbitrage,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Dodd-Frank: The Implications of US Global OTC
Derivative Regulation (Nov. 10, 2012), at 23, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2169401
(stating that foreign regulators have noted the possibility of overlapping and conflicts in
derivative regulation).
45. See Greenberger, supra note 21, at 6 (critiquing threats by the European Investment
Bank and the European Central Bank not to trade OTC swaps with U.S. banks if they are
subject to the Dodd-Frank Act’s clearing and collateral posting requirements); Victor
Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440 (2009) (proposing
the repeal of the implicit tax subsidy granted to sovereign wealth funds under a theory of
sovereign immunity pursuant to section 892 of the Internal Revenue Code).
46. Turley, supra note 1, at 615.
47. The Exchange Act grants jurisdiction to U.S. federal district courts for “conduct
occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the
United States.” Exchange Act §27(b)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa). Section 10b of the
Exchange Act requires that a plaintiff prove that a defendant made a material omission or
misrepresentation connected with the purchase or sale of a security with scienter, causing
economic loss to the plaintiff due to reliance on that omission or misrepresentation. Id. at §
10b (codified at 15 U.S.C § 78j(b)).
48. See Erez Reuveni, Extraterritoriality as Standing: A Standing Theory of the
Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Laws, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1072, 1083-84
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securities fraud actions by establishing a bright-line transactional test that
limited the application of Section 10b to purchases or sales made in the
United States or involving securities listed on a domestic exchange.49 Just
one month later, Congress responded by including a provision in the DoddFrank Act that establishes federal jurisdiction in cases filed by the SEC or
the Department of Justice.50 Effects-based regulation is also expressly set
forth in the new derivatives rules of the Dodd-Frank Act, which establish
extraterritorial jurisdiction over activities outside the U.S. that “have a
direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce
of the United States; or (2) contravene such rules or regulations . . . as are
necessary . . . to prevent the evasion of any provision of the [Dodd-Frank
Act] . . . .”51
CONDUCT-BASED REGULATION. Foreign entities may be subject to
regulation by U.S. regulators on the basis of transactions with U.S.
counterparties (or U.S.-domiciled foreign counterparties) or through U.S.
conduits.52 Foreign financial institutions and other foreign market
participants that transact with U.S. counterparties or through U.S. agents,
exchanges, bank accounts, or clearing systems may therefore be subject to
U.S. regulation even if their activities are undertaken offshore, the U.S.
counterparties or conduits act through foreign instrumentalities, and there
are no effects on the U.S. market or investors.53 The broad sweep of this
(2010) (defining “foreign-cubed” lawsuits).
49. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). This case has attracted
substantial scholarly attention. See, e.g., Joshua L. Boehm, Private Securities Fraud
Litigation after Morrison v. National Australia Bank: Reconsidering a Reliance-Based
Approach to Extraterritoriality, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 249 (2012) (discussing the narrowed
scope of Rule 10b-5 under the new test); Marco Ventoruzzo, Like Moths to a Flame?
International Securities Litigation After Morrison: Correcting the Supreme Court’s
“Transactional Test”, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 405 (2012) (noting the shortcomings of the new
test and proposing an alternate effects test).
50. Section 929(P) of the Dodd-Frank Act provides, in relevant part:
(c) Extraterritorial Jurisdiction.—The district courts of the United States and the
United States courts of any Territory shall have jurisdiction . . . alleging a
violation of [the antifraud provisions of this title] involving—“(1) conduct
within the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the
violation, even if the violation is committed by a foreign adviser and involves
only foreign investors; or “(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that
has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.”
Dodd-Frank Act § 929 (P).
51. Dodd-Frank Act § 722 (for swaps) and § 772(c) (for security-based swaps).
52. See Johnson, supra note 44, at 2.
53. An illuminating example is found in the regulation of derivatives under the DoddFrank Act. CFTC rules require a U.S. person to comply with transaction-level rules (i.e.,
requirements that apply to each swap transaction, such as clearing, margin, and real-time
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extraterritorial approach is evident in the “conduct” test that was the
counterpart to the “effects” test in securities antifraud actions under the
Exchange Act.54 The conduct test established federal subject matter
jurisdiction if foreign investors could demonstrate harm as a result of
conduct emanating from the United States. In essence, this test looks at the
situs and the materiality of the conduct in question, regardless of the
location of the parties or the markets where the transaction took place.55
This approach, like the effects test, has been criticized for its inconsistent
and unpredictable application, weighing against the tremendous discretion
that it gives judges to remedy alleged harms committed beyond the
territorial reach of U.S. laws.56 As with the effects test, the Dodd-Frank
Act expressly provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction on the basis of the
conduct test.57
The efficacy of any of these kinds of extraterritorial regulatory
authority is contingent on highly concentrated state power. That is, the
ability of a country to project its regulatory rules on foreign entities and
offshore economic activity depends on its status as an economic hegemon,
such as the United States, whose own internal market is powerful enough

reporting) in respect of any swap, regardless of where the transaction is actually conducted.
Since the definition of U.S. person covers foreign banks whose principal place of business is
in the United States, a foreign-based bank with significant operations in the United States
may fall under the definition of U.S. person and thereby be required to comply with the
Dodd-Frank Act for all of its swaps activities worldwide—in spite of any overlapping or
conflicting regulatory requirements in their home countries. See Final Exemptive Order
Regarding Compliance With Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 858, 863-64 (Jan. 7,
2013) (stating that the CFTC will not treat entities incorporated or organized outside the
United States and with a principal place of business in the United States as a “U.S. person”
until April 1, 2013).
54. The Exchange Act provides jurisdiction to U.S. federal district courts for “conduct
within the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation,
even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign
investors.” Exchange Act §27(b)(1) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa).
55. See Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Future of
Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 537, 543 (2011)
(describing the conduct test and the challenges in applying it).
56. See Alex Reed, But I’m an American! A Text-Based Rationale for Dismissing FSquared Securities Fraud Claims After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 14 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 515, 517-18 (2012) (discussing the various applications of the effects test before
Morrison).
57. See Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b)(1) (amending the Securities Act to adopt the
conduct test).
Commentators have noted the incongruence between the apparent
Congressional intent to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality in Morrison and the
Supreme Court’s rejection of the effects and conducts tests on the basis of the substantive
scope of Section 10(b) and not due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Richard W.
Painter, The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provision: Was It Effective, Needed
or Sufficient?, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 195, 199-205 (2011).
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either to deter or mitigate the negative effects of retaliation by foreign
regulators.58 However, the relative decline in the international financial
market dominance of the United States, along with the proliferation of new
sources of financial capital and the emergence of competing regulators in
new markets, may materially hinder the United States’ ability to regulate in
this manner.59 Financial globalization may impose a double-bind on U.S.
financial regulators by fostering new forms of cross-border financial
activities in unprecedented volume, while simultaneously hindering their
ability to manage and supervise the sources of these activities.
The extraterritorial application of U.S. law is circumscribed, both
expressly and implicitly, by canons of construction and principles of
American constitutional law.60 First and foremost is the presumption
against extraterritoriality, which posits that a law should be interpreted to
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States absent
express congressional intent of its extraterritorial reach.61 Another canon of
construction is the Charming Betsy canon, derived from Chief Justice John
Marshall’s statement that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”62
These canons reflect the fundamental importance of the doctrine of comity
as a principle of national decisionmaking. Comity is defined as “the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive or judicial acts of another nation.”63 Judicial pronouncements
rejecting the extraterritorial reach of domestic law are often clothed in the
language of comity through the application of the presumption against
extraterritoriality and the Charming Betsy canon, which establish a
rebuttable presumption against extraterritoriality that may only be
overcome by clear, explicit, and irrefutable evidence of legislative intent to
the contrary. Comity, when applied in this manner by a court, can serve as
a flexible tool of judicially-imposed abnegation of domestic statutory

58. See BRUMMER, supra note 28, at 40-43 (describing the “political economy”
problem of extraterritorial regulation).
59. Id. at 45-49 (citing the factors for the weakening of American financial dominance
and the effects on extraterritorial regulatory export by the United States).
60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§
402-03 (1987) (detailing the current status of the jurisdiction to prescribe under U.S. law).
Although there is no express prohibition in the Constitution on the promulgation of
extraterritorial legislation by Congress, the specific congressional powers in the Constitution
pursuant to which Congress may legislate extraterritorially include potential limits on this
authority. See Colangelo, supra note 31, at 136-58 (analyzing the Offence Clause, the
Foreign Commerce Clause, the Treaty Power, and the Foreign Affairs Power).
61. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
62. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).
63. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 143 (1895).
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authority.64 Existing doctrines and practices, however, are too inchoate and
narrowly applied to provide a consistent, predictable basis for addressing
the tensions between extraterritorial jurisdiction and national sovereignty in
the context of regulatory authority.65
2. Transnational Governance: Extraterritorial Regulation by Other
Means
The limitations of extraterritorial regulation reflect the evolving,
multilayered environment of international finance. Extraterritoriality is but
one component of the set of rules, resources, and institutions that manage
international financial and monetary affairs—the so-called international
financial architecture. The political and legal constraints faced by
governmental authorities seeking to regulate extraterritorially, coupled with
the limits of treaty-based regimes, have led countries in the past several
decades to explore new forms of global financial regulation. The global,
broadly inter-connected nature of market participants and their activities
reinforces the need for governments to address obstacles to regulatory
coordination, particularly given the newfound emphasis on identifying and
managing systemic risk following the global financial crisis.
Regulatory authority is increasingly exercised through multiple,
overlapping regulatory frameworks that feature a wide constellation of
stakeholders and cross several distinct jurisdictional boundaries.66 To
facilitate international coordination and cooperation in the absence of a
global financial regulator, new models of transnational economic regulation
have emerged, consisting of a latticework of predominantly non-binding
rules, standards, and best practices developed by national regulatory
agencies, private standard-setting bodies, international financial
institutions, and various non-state actors.67 These new forms of global
governance eschew state-centric regulation and mandatory rules for
rulemaking based on consultation, soft law norms, and the direct and/or

64. See Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping “International Comity”, 83 IOWA L. REV. 893,
906-38 (1998) (analyzing the circumstances in which courts may apply comity).
65. See infra Part III.A.
66. See Rolf H. Weber, Multilayered Governance in International Financial
Regulation and Supervision, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 683, 685-86 (2010) (describing the limited
scope and enforcement powers of traditional international law instruments and the
fragmentation of global financial regulation).
67. See Anu Piiola, Assessing Theories of Global Governance: A Case Study of
International Antitrust Regulation, 39 STAN. J. INT’L. L. 207, 208-09 (2003) (defining
transgovernmental and transnational models of global governance as well as traditional
intergovernmental governance and concluding that none of them alone is sufficient or
desirable).
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indirect participation of non-state actors.68
One particular model of global governance, transgovernmental
regulatory networks, involves regulation through self-interested domestic
regulators working in close coordination across national borders, instead of
being confined within the administrative rulemaking and strategic decisionmaking processes of individual states.69 The regulation of various areas of
global finance has been a productive area for these kinds of networks. The
Financial Stability Board, established by the G20 in 2009 to coordinate
financial policies globally, includes the central banks and finance ministries
from most G20 member countries and a number of international financial
institutions and standard-setting bodies.70 In the banking sector, the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, which formulated the 1988 Basel
Accord on capital adequacy (known as Basel I), arguably constitutes the
apex of network-based global lawmaking, and has continued its work in the
formulation of new capital adequacy standards under Basel I’s successors,
Basel II and Basel III.71 In regards to securities regulation, the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and various bilateral
cooperative agreements have played an important role in global standardsetting.72 With respect to the regulation of the global OTC derivatives
market, the Dodd-Frank Act expressly mandates that the SEC, CFTC, and
prudential regulators (such as the Federal Reserve) engage in consultation
and coordination with their foreign regulatory counterparts.73 Similarly,
transnational private networks have worked alongside public transnational
institutions to reduce systemic risk through the implementation of
mandatory central counterparty clearing of swaps.74
68. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation
through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 541-45 (2009) (describing decentralized transnational governance
schemes).
69. See Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 5
(2002); David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of
International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281, 312-25 (1998).
See also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 68, at 505 (distinguishing transgovernmental
regulatory networks from other transnational governance schemes run by private actors).
70. See Greene & Boehm, supra note 26, at 1090-91.
71. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits,
34 YALE J. INT’L L. 113, 132-43 (2009).
72. See Raustiala, supra note 69, at 28-35; Zaring, supra note 69, at 292-97.
73. See Dodd-Frank Act § 752.
74. See Anupam Chander & Randall Costa, Clearing Credit Default Swaps: A Case
Study in Global Legal Convergence, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 639, 678-80 (2010) (detailing the
role of transnational networks in causing regulatory convergence). Swaps, a type of
derivative instrument, consist of customized legal contracts based on standardized industry
models that are privately negotiated and settled by counterparties to provide each other with
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Viewed in their best light, these networks represent the zenith of the
“disaggregated state”:
the constitutive components of national
governments collectively acting as a world government, in function but not
form.75 However, the transformational effects of networks on the
international economic system are unsettled.76 Further, their limitations
reveal the salience of problems in global financial regulation that are shared
by extraterritorial regulation.
Indeed, these global governance
mechanisms—rather than supplanting domestic regulation—instead
complement and augment extraterritorial regulatory authority.77 The
coordination rationale for transgovernmental regulatory networks—
specifically, the desire of domestic regulators to find quicker, more
efficient ways to cooperate across borders—hints at the extent to which
domestic politics might dominate the regulatory process. Far from
occupying a global technocratic space removed from the vagaries of
domestic lawmaking, transgovernmental regulatory networks may shape
and perpetuate the preferences of domestic interests and the underlying
state power of their participants.78 Notwithstanding the shift away from
traditional modes of government-dictated regulatory authority based on
command-and-control, these new forms of global governance complement
and augment domestic extraterritorial power rather than supplanting or
compromising it.79 Governments continue to assert their sovereign
authority over non-state actors.80 Rather than being modulated by informal

a series of cash flows. In contrast to futures and options, swaps are not based on the
physical exchange of underlying assets. They are used to hedge risk, lower funding costs,
and for speculative purposes, among other reasons. See SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 9, at
959-64.
75. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 36-64 (2004) (discussing the
role of transgovernmental networks of regulators as an integral component of a “new world
order”).
76. See Verdier, supra note 71, at 161-70; Sungjoon Cho & Claire R. Kelly, Promises
and Perils of New Global Governance: A Case of the G20, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 491, 548-53
(2012) (addressing doubts about the effectiveness of the G20 coordinating functions in the
wake of the global financial crisis).
77. See Daniel W. Drezner, Globalization and Policy Convergence, 3 INT’L STUD. REV.
53, 76-77 (2001) (noting that changes in the international economic system induced by
globalization have affected the bargaining modus operandi of state regulatory power but
have not inexorably diminished it).
78. See Verdier, supra note 71, at 161-62; Brummer, supra note 27, at 642; Cho &
Kelly, supra note 76, at 555-56.
79. See Robert F. Weber, New Governance, Financial Regulation, and Challenges to
Legitimacy: The Example of the Internal Models Approach to Capital Adequacy Regulation,
62 ADMIN. L. REV. 783, 839-41 (2010) (evaluating the use of risk models in regulatory
regimes).
80. See DREZNER, supra note 22, at 19-22 (describing and critiquing global civil
society theories of globalization).
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consultative processes, the state remains the cornerstone of global financial
regulation, and the regulatory reach of powerful states is augmented as a
result of their ability to encourage, persuade, or compel their foreign
regulatory counterparts to adopt their preferred regulatory models.81
II.

THE FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES AND LEGAL TREATMENT OF STATEOWNED FINANCIAL ENTITIES

The expanding scope of global financial regulation reflects the
collective desire to respond to the risks of financial globalization. The
rationale for regulation rests on the balancing of the public interest with the
private interests of market participants. This dynamic is complicated in the
case of state-owned financial entities, whose legal character reflects their
uniquely public missions.
Most importantly, their immunities and
privileges from jurisdiction have been long enshrined under international
law. The normative and operational implications of extraterritorial
regulation are underscored by the unique role of the state as a market
participant.
The following discussion describes this unique class of entities and
their growing engagement in the financial markets as well as their
increasingly important role as global financial regulators. This analysis
may also provide insights applicable to state-owned banks and other stateowned enterprises with non-public missions, which are not directly
addressed in this Article. It provides an overview of the distinct, yet related
doctrines of sovereign immunity and intergovernmental immunity. An indepth examination of the experience of international financial institutions
in respect of the Dodd-Frank Act’s derivatives rules suggests how
international privileges and immunities may limit, preclude, or condition
the regulation of the financial activities of IFIs and other state-owned
financial entities.
A.

The Structure and Activities of State-Owned Financial Entities in
Global Financial Markets

State-owned financial entities participate in global financial markets in
a variety of ways. They engage in borrowing and lending operations with
private banks and other financial institutions. They issue bonds in global
securities markets. They use swaps and other derivatives instruments to
hedge risk. They invest in debt and equity through investment funds.

81. See Raustiala, supra note 69, at 56-61 (describing network-driven regulatory
convergence).
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The major classes of state-owned financial entities with a substantial
presence in global financial markets include:
CENTRAL BANKS. Central banks are governmental institutions with
wide-ranging monetary and regulatory responsibilities, among which
include setting interest rates, controlling the country’s money supply (open
market operations), managing foreign exchange reserves, supervising the
banking system, and serving as the government’s banker.82 In these
capacities, central banks lend and borrow from private banks to determine
market interest rates, and also make available loans to distressed private
financial institutions as a lender of last resort.83 Central banks buy and sell
debt securities and use foreign currency swaps to conduct open market
operations and manage their foreign exchange reserves.84 Many central
banks issue their own debt securities to facilitate exchange rate and
liquidity policy objectives.85 They are generally owned by a central
government and organized as a separate legal entity.86
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (IFIS). IFIs are financial
institutions established and owned by multiple governments. The most
prominent and influential IFIs are the Bretton Woods institutions
established after World War II: the IMF and the World Bank.87 Alongside
82. The breadth of central bank operations and policies is beyond the scope of this
Article. For further discussion of central bank policies, see HANDBOOK OF CENTRAL
BANKING, FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION (Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato
Masciandaro eds., 2011).
83. See SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 9, at 43-46, 262-63 (describing the Federal
Reserve Bank’s use of its discount window); see also Note, Too Sovereign to be Sued:
Immunity of Central Banks in Times of Financial Crisis, 124 HARV. L. REV. 550, 565-66
(2010) (describing central banks’ liquidity support during the global financial crisis)
[hereinafter HLR Note].
84. See Catharina J. Hooyman, The Use of Foreign Exchange Swaps by Central Banks:
A Survey (IMF Working Paper No. 93/64, Aug. 1993), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=1139 (discussing the use and
problems with foreign exchange swaps).
85. See Andrew Filardo, Madhusudan Mohanty & Ramon Moreno, Central Bank and
Government Debt Management: Issues for Monetary Policy, in FISCAL POLICY, PUBLIC
DEBT AND MONETARY POLICY IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES 51, 54-55, 66-68 (BIS
Papers No. 67, Oct. 2012), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap67d_rh.pdf
(looking at the growth of the government debt market). The Federal Reserve Bank does not
issue its own bonds. See Robert Cyran & Dwight Cass, Reducing Debt, But Also Prospects,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2008, at B2 (criticizing the prospect of the Federal Reserve Bank
issuing its own bonds).
86. See Paul L. Lee, Central Banks and Sovereign Immunity, 41 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 327, 350-51 (2003).
87. The World Bank Group consists of five institutions, most of which are devoted to
economic development: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
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the World Bank are numerous other multilateral development banks that
provide financing and technical assistance for development-related
purposes in specific regions, most notably: the African Development Bank
(AfDB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB). IFIs are international organizations, established
pursuant to international treaties and governed by their member states.88
These institutions issue debt securities to institutional and retail investors in
capital markets throughout the world to fund their operations.89 They use
derivatives to hedge market risks in lending, borrowing, equity
management, and investment operations.90
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS (SWFS). Sovereign wealth funds are
investment vehicles that are owned by governments, funded by foreign
exchange assets, and managed separately from official reserves.91 These
funds have been subject to growing scrutiny in recent years due to their
shift from conservative debt instruments to comparatively higher-yielding
equities—most notably, acquisitions of partial ownership stakes in private
financial entities such as Blackstone, Morgan Stanley, and UBS.92

(IBRD); the International Development Association (IDA); the International Finance
Corporation (IFC); the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA); and the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
88. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 22, 1944, 2
U.N.T.S. 39 [hereinafter IMF Articles of Agreement]; International Bank of Reconstruction
and Development Articles of Agreement, Dec. 27, 1945, 2 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter IBRD
Articles of Agreement]; Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank, Aug. 4,
1963, 510 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AfDB Agreement]; Agreement Establishing the Asian
Development Bank, Aug. 22, 1966, 571 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter ADB Agreement];
Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Mar. 28,
1991, 29 I.L.M. 1083 [hereinafter EBRD Agreement]; Agreement Establishing the InterAmerican Development Bank, Dec. 30, 1959, 389 U.N.T.S. 69 [hereinafter IDB Charter].
89. IBRD alone borrows approximately U.S. $30 billion a year through bond
issuances. See Everything you always wanted to know about the World Bank, THE WORLD
BANK, http://treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/pdf/WorldBankFacts.pdf (last visited May 15,
2014).
90. See, e.g., IBRD, Management’s Discussion & Analysis and Financial Statements,
at
7,
81-88
(June
30,
2012),
available
at
http://treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/pdf/IBRD_MDA_and_Financial_Statements_June_2012.
pdf (describing IBRD’s use of swaps to hedge interest rate risk and foreign exchange risk).
IBRD also offers derivatives intermediation services to its developing country borrowers.
See id. at 14, 81 (describing the IBRD’s uses of derivative instruments).
91. Paul Rose, Sovereigns as Shareholders, 87 N.C. L. REV. 102, 103 (2008). Among
the largest and most active SWFs are Norway’s Government Pension Fund – Global, the
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, the China Investment Corporation, and Temasek Holdings
of Singapore.
92. See Richard A. Epstein & Amanda M. Rose, The Regulation of Sovereign Wealth
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Regulatory concerns specific to SWFs have focused on the specter of their
political influence on investment decisions.93
Regulation of these state-owned financial entities by foreign and
international regulators addresses a number of policy considerations. Stateowned financial entities are sometimes subject to the same requirements as
their private sector counterparts, with no expressly different treatment due
to their sovereign or supranational status.94 In other instances, they are
subject to special requirements, such as the disclosure rules of the
Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act) for foreign governmental
issuers.95 Alternatively, they are exempted from certain regulatory
requirements due to their sovereign or supranational status.96 State-owned
financial entities may be subject to special regulation if they engage in
certain types of financial activities or fail to meet certain industrydetermined standards.97 The application of international privileges and
Funds: The Virtues of Going Slow, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 116 (2009).
93. See Lawrence Summers, Funds That Shake Capitalist Logic, FIN. TIMES, July 29,
2007 (raising concerns about SWFs’ pursuit of objectives other than maximizing riskadjusted returns, such as extracting technology from companies or exerting political
influence over host country governments).
94. See Epstein & Rose, supra note 92, at 117-18 (noting that SWFs are subject to the
Exchange Act’s disclosure requirements under Section 13(d) and anti-fraud provisions of
federal securities, antitrust, and state corporate laws).
95. See Securities Act § 7 Information Required on Registration Statement (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 77g); see also Edward F. Greene & Ronald Adee, The Securities of Foreign
Governments, Political Subdivisions and Multinational Organizations, 10 N.C. J. INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 1, 6-16 (1985) (detailing disclosure requirements of foreign governments that
issue securities in the U.S.).
96. Numerous examples abound in various areas of financial regulation. For example,
the World Bank and regional multilateral development banks are exempt from the
registration requirements of the Securities Act and the disclosure requirements of the
Exchange Act. Instead, each institution is required only to file its annual report, quarterly
financial reports, and advance reports of any distributions in the United States. See 22
U.S.C. § 286k-1 (IBRD); 22 U.S.C. § 290i-9 (AfDB); 22 U.S.C. § 285h (ADB); 22 U.S.C. §
290l-7 (EBRD); 22 U.S.C. § 283h (IDB); see also Greene & Adee, supra note 95, at 24-28
(discussing the historical development of securities disclosure requirements). Another
example is Basel I’s treatment of sovereign debt. Under Basel I capital adequacy rules, debt
issued by the Federal Reserve Bank and other OECD-member central banks were granted
zero risk weighting, thereby granting preferential treatment to such sovereigns vis-à-vis
other securities issuers. See SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 9, at 566 (summarizing credit
risk under Basel I).
97. The Santiago Principles, a voluntary code of conduct created by certain
governments that own SWFs, establishes an equivalency standard for SWFs, stipulating that
host countries shall “not subject SWF[s] to any requirement, obligation, restriction, or
regulatory action exceeding that to which other investors in similar circumstances may be
subject” so long as SWFs operate “in compliance with all applicable regulatory and
disclosure requirements.” International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds,
Sovereign Wealth Funds: Generally Accepted Principles and Practices “Santiago Principles”
(Oct. 2008), GAPP 15 Principle, Explanation and Commentary, available at
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immunities may result in a complete or partial exemption from regulation
of a given class of state-owned entity or certain conditions on their
regulation.98
Within the panorama of financial globalization and global financial
regulation, the activities of state-owned financial entities as market
participants are important in two respects. First, the growth and
proliferation of state-owned financial entities means that they will continue
to transact with and, in certain contexts, compete against their private
sector counterparts.99 Second, the regulatory footprint of some of these
very same market participants has continued to evolve and expand. Central
banks, within their own respective jurisdictions and in coordination with
each other, engage in macroprudential supervision.100 Another important
element of global financial regulation is the role of IFIs. The regulatory
authority of the IMF, the World Bank, and other IFIs has been traditionally
restricted by the limited legal scope of their missions.101 Although their
capacity to regulate through conditionality (i.e., by making financial and
technical assistance to borrowers conditional on the implementation of
domestic regulatory standards or policies) is limited by demand for their
http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf. See also Larry Catá Backer,
Sovereign Wealth Funds as Regulatory Chameleons: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth
Funds and Public Global Governance Through Private Global Investments, 41 GEO. J.
INT’L L. 425, 448 (2010); Joseph J. Norton, The “Santiago Principles” and the
International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds: Evolving Components of the New Bretton
Woods II Post-Global Financial Crisis Architecture and Another Example of Ad Hoc Global
Administrative Networking and Related “Soft” Rulemaking?, 29 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN.
L. 465, 512-18 (2010) (describing the scope of the Santiago Principles).
98. See infra Part II.C.
99. IFIs have established investment companies that manage funds on behalf of third
party clients. One notable example is the IFC Asset Management Company (AMC), a
wholly-owned subsidiary of the World Bank Group’s International Finance Corporation,
which invests public and private funds in IFC co-financed projects. As of March 31, 2012,
AMC had approximately U.S. $4.2 billion in assets under management. See IFC Asset
Management
Company,
Issue
Brief,
http://www1.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/3e284300486a6c72bc9afff995bd23db/SM12_IFCIss
ueBrief_AMC.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (last visited May 15, 2014).
100. The Dodd-Frank Act requires the Financial Stability Oversight Council, the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Secretary of the Treasury to consult
with foreign regulatory counterparts and international organizations in respect of matters
relating to systemic risk and prudential regulation. See Dodd-Frank Act § 175(b) and (c), 12
U.S.C. § 5373 (2012); see also Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Speech at the 47th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and
Competition: Implementing a Macroprudential Approach to Supervision and Regulation
(May
5,
2011),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110505a.pdf
(discussing
macroprudential policy in the United States).
101. See Pan, supra note 15, at 251; see also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 68, at 533-37
(noting the weak governance powers of traditional intergovernmental organizations).
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resources, the significant uptick in their lending activities in the aftermath
of the global financial crisis refutes concerns of their obsolescence.102 The
surveillance and monitoring responsibilities of the World Bank and the
IMF, both of macroeconomic stability generally as well as financial codes
and standards specifically, are unique in the international system.103 The
role of IFIs to promote best practices through technical assistance and
economic analysis, though not formalized as a regulatory power per se,
underscores the broad-based roles of these institutions in structuring
financial markets.104
B.

International Privileges and Immunities under International Law

State-owned financial entities may seek exemption from
extraterritorial regulation on the basis of international privileges and
immunities, a diverse set of principles under international law for the
benefit of states and international organizations. Their diverse rationales
and applications, coupled with uncertainty regarding their relevance to the
regulation of financial activities, necessitate a closer examination.
1. The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity
The doctrine of sovereign immunity permits a state to claim freedom
from the jurisdiction of a foreign state.105 Sovereign immunity developed

102. See BRUMMER, supra note 28, at 147-50. But see David Zaring, International
Institutional Performance in Crisis, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 475, 490-93 (2010) (arguing that the
IMF has a narrow role in the international financial architecture solely relevant to
developing countries).
103. See Brummer, supra note 8, at 281-82 (discussing the Financial Sector Assessment
Program and financial sector assessments included in Reports on Observance and Codes
issued by the IMF and the World Bank). But see Pan, supra note 15, at 252 n.26 (noting the
lack of authority in the IMF Articles of Agreement to directly monitor private firms).
104. The World Bank’s Financial and Private Sector Development Vice Presidency,
which includes programs devoted to financial systems, financial infrastructure, financial
market integrity, and corporate governance, is one example.
105. In this context, the doctrine of sovereign immunity has developed to address its
application at distinct stages of the judicial process: (i) foreign state immunity from the
jurisdiction of the courts of another state to adjudicate a claim against it (immunity from
jurisdiction); and (ii) the exemption of a foreign state from enforcement of an adverse
judgment through attachment and execution of its state property (immunity from attachment
and execution). Akehurst, supra note 33, at 118. It may be contrasted to the invocation of
international privileges and immunities in the context of exercises of regulatory authority—
i.e., regulatory immunity.
The Act of State doctrine is the most notable example of a doctrine related to, but
doctrinally distinct from, sovereign immunity. Under U.S. law, the Act of State doctrine
provides that U.S. courts will not judge the validity of official acts of a foreign government
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from the nation-state system, based on the sanctity of national sovereignty
and the principle of non-interference by any one state in the internal affairs
of any other. Traditionally, the practice and policies of the United States
were based on the theory of absolute immunity, which granted foreign
states immunity for all their activities.106 Marked by the Tate Letter in
1952, the United States adopted the “restrictive” approach to immunity,
which distinguishes between a foreign state’s governmental acts (jure
imperii) and its private acts (jure gestionis), the latter of which are not
entitled to sovereign immunity.107
The restrictive approach was codified in U.S. law by the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976, which vests responsibility for
immunity determinations by the U.S. government with the federal
judiciary.108 The FSIA establishes a general rule of sovereign immunity
with certain specific, statutorily-defined exceptions.109 A key consideration
with respect to sovereign immunity revolves around the definition of a
foreign state. The FSIA expressly includes in its definition of foreign state
a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state.110 Government ministries and central banks are afforded the
carried out in its own territory. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
Much like the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the Act of State doctrine has been applied in
an ad hoc manner in respect of the enforcement of foreign sovereign contracts, leading to
unpredictability in international commercial transactions with foreign government
counterparties. See Michael D. Ramsey, Acts of State and Foreign Sovereign Obligations,
39 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 1, 2-4, 46-51 (1998) (discussing the application of the Act of State
doctrine).
106. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434 n.1
(1989).
107. See Letter of Acting Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State, Jack B. Tate, to
Department of Justice (May 19, 1952) reprinted in 26 Dep’t. State Bull. 984 (1952); see
also Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711–715 (1976) (quoting
the same).
108. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified in various sections of Title 28
of the U.S. Code) [hereinafter FSIA]. The FSIA governs both immunity from jurisdiction
and immunity from attachment and execution. The following discussion addresses the rules
that apply to the former due to its nexus with the right of a foreign state to assert regulatory
immunity.
Multilateral initiatives have had modest success and limited effects on state
practice. The European Convention on State Immunity entered into force in 1976, and
includes eight signatory parties. See European Convention on State Immunity, May 16,
1972, 11 I.L.M. 470 (1972). The United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities
of States has not yet been ratified by a sufficient number of states to enter into force. See
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, G.A.
Res. 59/38 U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/38 (Dec. 2, 2004).
109. The FSIA provides that “a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of
the courts of the United States . . . except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this
chapter.” 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2010).
110. Id. at § 1603(a).
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protections of the FSIA, as well as many other state-owned financial
entities.111 Nonetheless, there is uncertainty regarding the extent to which a
separately-managed state-owned entity (such as a SWF) would be treated
differently from an entity with a discrete pool of assets but without legal
personality separate from the state.112
The FSIA enumerates nine categorical exceptions to sovereign
immunity—most notably, the waiver exception and the commercial activity
exception.113 The waiver exception concerns the waiver by a foreign state
of its sovereign immunity, either explicitly or by implication.114 Explicit
waivers constitute a contractual agreement by a foreign state to forego the
default rule of immunity in the context of negotiated financial
transactions.115 The commercial activity exception, in contrast, strips the
protections of sovereign immunity whenever a foreign state engages in a
course of conduct, a particular transaction, or an act that is commercial in
nature, regardless of its purpose.116 Under this reasoning, the commercial
activity exception applies to any type of conduct that a private party could
111. The FSIA broadly defines “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” to cover
any entity:
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state
or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States . . . nor created
under the laws of any third country.
Id. at § 1603(a) and (b).
However, indirect state ownership of a firm, such as through a holding company,
does not qualify. See generally Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003)
(examining if and how sovereign immunity applies to firms owned by a foreign state).
112. See David Gaukrodger, Foreign State Immunity and Foreign Government
Controlled Investors (OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2010/2, 2010), at
14-18, available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/45036449.pdf; HLR Note, supra
note 83, at 558-63 (describing the efforts of litigants seeking attachment of central bank
assets based on the argument that central banks are the corporate “alter ego” of their state
parents).
113. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2010) (setting forth the FSIA’s specific exceptions to
immunity from jurisdiction). The other exceptions to sovereign immunity specified in the
FSIA are based on: expropriation; property in the United States; tort injury occurring in the
United States; arbitration; torture, extrajudicial killing, sabotage, or kidnapping;
enforcement of a maritime lien; and foreclosure of a maritime mortgage.
114. Id. at § 1605(a)(1).
115. See Lee, supra note 86, at 338-39.
116. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (2010) (defining commercial activity); see also Republic
of Argentina v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 617 (1992) (applying the commercial activity
exception to the rescheduling of bonds issued by the Government of Argentina and
determining that it was “irrelevant why Argentina participated in the bond market in the
manner of a private actor; it matters only that it did so”).
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similarly conduct.117
The commercial activity exception provides
jurisdiction based upon a nexus with the United States established by: (i)
“a commercial activity carried on in the United States”; (ii) “an act
performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity”
elsewhere; or (iii) “an act outside the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere” if the
“act causes a direct effect in the United States.”118
2. The Doctrine of Intergovernmental Immunity
The privileges and immunities of international organizations, or
intergovernmental immunity, share the underlying principles of sovereign
immunity. Intergovernmental immunity is expressly incorporated into the
international treaties by which IFIs are governed.119 The application of
intergovernmental immunity reflects its distinct doctrinal foundations and
purposes. The creation of international organizations in the mid-nineteenth
century spurred their member states to endow them with diplomatic
privileges and immunities.120 In contrast to sovereign immunity, the
evolution of intergovernmental immunity in the twentieth century did not
lead to the adoption of restrictive immunity based on the distinction
between governmental and private acts.
Instead, the basis for
intergovernmental immunity is functional necessity, or the idea “that
117. See Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614.
118. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2010).
119. The IBRD Articles of Agreement is generally indicative:
Actions may be brought against the Bank only in a court of competent
jurisdiction in the territories of a member in which the Bank has an office, has
appointed an agent for the purpose of accepting service or notice of process, or
has issued or guaranteed securities. The property and assets of the Bank shall,
wheresoever located and by whomsoever held, be immune from all forms of
seizure, attachment or execution before the delivery of final judgment against
the Bank.
IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 88, at art. VII(3). The parallel provisions of the
agreements of IDA, IFC, and most of the regional multilateral development banks include
substantively identical language. See International Development Association Articles of
Agreement, Jan. 24, 1960, 439 U.N.T.S. 249, art. VII(3); International Finance Corporation
Articles of Agreement, May 25, 1955, 264 U.N.T.S. 118, art. VI(3); AfDB Agreement, art.
52; EBRD Agreement, arts. 44 and 46; IDB Charter, art. XI(3).
In contrast, the IMF Articles of Agreement expressly provides for absolute
immunity without qualification, except upon an express waiver by the IMF itself. See IMF
Articles of Agreement, art. IX(3) (explaining how the IMF has full immunity from legal
proceedings unless waived).
120. See Charles H. Brower, International Immunities: Some Dissident Views on the
Role of Municipal Courts, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 9-11 (2000) (explaining the development of
immunities for international organizations during the 1800s and early 1900s).

PARK_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

768

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

6/3/14 10:06 AM

[Vol. 16:3

international organizations are entitled to such immunities as will enable
them to exercise their functions in the fulfillment of their purposes.”121
This doctrine, initially established in the United Nations Charter, is
considered a customary rule of international law, applicable to both
member states and non-member states.122 It is generally reflected in IFIs’
constitutive agreements, which do not include commercial activity
exceptions.123
The International Organization Immunity Act of 1945 (IOIA) is the
principal statutory basis for intergovernmental immunity under U.S. law.124
The text of the IOIA appears to support an expansive view of
intergovernmental immunity that more closely resembles absolute
sovereign immunity than the FSIA’s restrictive approach to sovereign
immunity.125 Broad interpretations of the functional necessity doctrine, in
conjunction with the narrow interpretations of the exceptions set forth in
their constitutive agreements, have led to calls from critics of international
organizations to restrict intergovernmental immunity.126

121. Michael Singer, Jurisdictional Immunity of International Organizations: Human
Rights and Functional Necessity Concerns, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 53, 56 (1995).
122. Brower, supra note 120, at 19-20. Article 105 of the Charter provides that: “[t]he
Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and
immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.” U.N. Charter art. 105, para.
1.
123. See Steven Herz, Rethinking International Financial Institution Immunity, in
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS & INTERNATIONAL LAW 137, 155-57 (Daniel D.
Bradlow & David B. Hunter eds., 2010) (discussing the doctrine of functional necessity and
its application by domestic courts).
124. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 288-288f (2010) (defining international organizations and their
privileges and immunities under U.S. law). In order for an international organization to be
granted the privileges and immunities set forth in the IOIA, two requirements generally
must be met: (i) the United States must be a member of such organization; and (ii) the
President must issue an Executive Order designating the international organization as one
entitled to enjoy the benefits of the IOIA. See id. at § 288 (defining international
organizations and explaining how they are designated). See also Singer, supra note 121, at
66 n.43 (discussing the IOIA).
125. The IOIA provides, in relevant part, that international organizations “shall enjoy
the same immunity from suit and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign
governments, except to the extent that such organizations may expressly waive their
immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.” 22 U.S.C. §
288a(b) (2010). See Atkinson v. Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (both finding that IFIs were entitled
to broad-based claims to immunity in respect of tort actions brought by former employees).
126. See Steven Herz, International Organizations in U.S. Courts: Reconsidering the
Anachronism of Absolute Immunity, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 471, 492-513 (2008)
(critiquing broad interpretations of intergovernmental immunity by U.S. federal courts).
These critiques do not directly address regulatory immunity or global financial regulation,
and this Article does not take a position on their substantive content.
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3. Applications of International Privileges and Immunities to Global
Finance
The situations in which international privileges and immunities are
asserted by state-owned financial entities reflect the diverse ways in which
they participate in the financial markets. Sovereign bond offerings have
generally been treated as “commercial activity” under the FSIA, and are
therefore not immune to suits brought by bondholders under federal
securities law.127 The same analysis would presumably apply to loans and
equity support to private entities by central banks, equity investments by
foreign government agencies, and SWFs.128 In such cases, the threshold
consideration is which sovereign act is the basis of the civil action against
the state. For example, the imposition of exchange controls may be
considered a governmental act, whereas the actual issuance of securities
into global capital markets may be considered a commercial activity.129 In
either case, courts rely on their assessment of the private/commercial nature
of the transaction or activity at issue, rather than the governmental purpose
of such transaction or activity.130
In the case of IFIs, the application of intergovernmental immunity to
their financial activities is muddled by differing interpretations regarding
the scope of the functional necessity doctrine. In its most favorable and
literal interpretation, any act relating to a core function may be entitled to
immunity if it is deemed to be necessary for the functioning of the
institution. Therefore, quite plausibly, loans to sovereign and nonsovereign borrowers, as well as to the capital reserves of IFIs themselves,
would be immune from jurisdiction and attachment by a domestic court.
Likewise, the borrowing and hedging activities of IFIs in international
capital markets through issuing bonds and entering into derivatives
transactions may be immune from suit given their importance to IFIs—
notwithstanding the fact that, as commercial activities, such transactions
would fall outside the protections of a restrictive theory of immunity. The
constitutive agreements of IFIs appear to embrace this view, as reflected in
the IBRD Articles of Agreement, which provides: “To the extent necessary
to carry out the operations provided for in this Agreement and subject to
127. See HLR Note, supra note 83, at 556 (discussing the Supreme Court’s test for
whether an activity is entitled to immunity).
128. See id. at 565-66 (discussing how central bank support for private entities is treated
as commercial activity).
129. See Greene & Adee, supra note 95, at 18-19 (examining sovereign immunity and
its interaction with commercial activity). See also text accompanying note 107.
130. See Lee, supra note 86, at 371-74 (concluding that foreign exchange transactions
would be treated as a commercial act, even if private sector banks do not engage in the sale
of foreign exchange in a given market).
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the provisions of this Agreement, all property and assets of the Bank shall
be free from restrictions, regulations, controls and moratoria of any
nature.”131
Countervailing examples and counterarguments qualify this expansive
view, however. For certain kinds of transactions, IFIs expressly agree to a
carve-out of their intergovernmental immunity for particular types of
financial activities in their constitutive agreements.132 In many other
instances, IFIs will agree ex ante to arbitration in contracts with
counterparties.133 More broadly, critics of IFIs point out that the functional
necessity doctrine can only be satisfied if IFIs may be sued in accordance
with the expectations of counterparties in the specific market in which they
are transacting. According to these critics, absent an express waiver by an
IFI, its intergovernmental immunity should be denied because such
intergovernmental immunity places an undue burden on the ability of the
IFI to exercise its functions in the market.134 This view envisions a sliding
scale of intergovernmental immunity in respect of IFIs’ financial activities
that would ratchet up or down based on the reasonable commercial
expectations of their counterparties.
As is evident in the foregoing analysis, although international
privileges and immunities may provide protection from legislative, judicial,
or regulatory jurisdiction under international law, these doctrines
predominantly arise in the context of litigation by private parties against

131. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 88, at art. VII(6).
132. See, e.g., id., art. VII(3) (providing that “[a]ctions may be brought against the Bank
only in a court . . . in which the Bank . . . has issued or guaranteed securities”). See also
Rutsel Silvestre J. Martha, International Financial Institutions and Claims of Private
Parties: Immunity Obliges, in THE WORLD BANK LEGAL REVIEW: INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND GLOBAL LEGAL GOVERNANCE 93, 122-24 (Hassane Cissé,
Daniel D. Bradlow & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 2012) (examining the circumstances in
which intergovernmental immunity might not be applicable).
For example, the ADB Agreement expressly carves out from the ADB’s
intergovernmental immunity any activities relating to the operation of the institution (i.e.,
any financial activities not directly related to its development mandate), providing that:
The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process, except in
cases arising out of or in connection with the exercise of its powers to borrow
money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or underwrite the sale of
securities, in which cases actions may be brought against the Bank in a court of
competent jurisdiction in the territory of a country in which the Bank has its
principal or a branch office, or has appointed an agent for the purpose of
accepting service or notice of process, or has issued or guaranteed securities.
ADB Agreement, supra note 88, at art. 50 (emphasis added).
133. See Brower, supra note 120, at 78-79 (characterizing submission to international
arbitration as the overwhelming practice of international organizations).
134. See Singer, supra note 121, at 136-37.
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foreign states.135 Due to the historical context in which these doctrines
have evolved, their application to legal obligations imposed by foreign
states through regulation is relatively untested.136 Domestic regulators,
which are not strictly obligated to follow jurisprudence interpreting the
scope and application of international privileges and immunities, have dealt
with regulatory immunity on a case-by-case basis. These instances of ad
hoc administrative rulemaking provide a unique opportunity to evaluate
existing rules and practices.
C.

Case Study: International Financial Institutions and the Regulation of
Swaps under the Dodd-Frank Act

The regulatory reforms enacted in the wake of the global financial
crisis lead to newfound questions about the special legal status of stateowned financial entities. In particular, the implementation of the
regulatory oversight of OTC derivatives mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act
has become the focus of unprecedented attention. The relative openness of
the administrative rulemaking process in the United States, coupled with
the absence of any statutory guidance in the text of the Dodd-Frank Act
itself, spurred the direct engagement of various state-owned financial
entities throughout the world with U.S. financial regulators. The following
analysis highlights the ongoing regulatory dialogue conducted by IFIs,
individually and collectively.137 The concerns raised by IFIs are shared by
foreign central banks and other state-owned financial entities with similar
operational and legal characteristics.138 All of these institutions have cited
135. See Akehurst, supra note 33, at 118.
136. See Gaukrodger, supra note 112, at 51 (concluding that it is difficult to draw
general conclusions about foreign state immunity from host state regulation due to the lack
of specific treaty-based or statutory authority and the scarcity of state practice).
137. The foregoing discussion focuses on the outreach by multilateral development
banks of which the United States is a member, which included, inter alia, members of the
World Bank Group (i.e., IBRD, IDA, IFC, and MIGA), the AfDB, the ADB, the EBRD, and
the IDB.
138. See, e.g., Letter from Günter Pleines, Bank for Int’l Settlements, to David A.
Stawick, Sec’y, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n and Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y,
U.S.
Sec.
&
Exch.
Comm’n
(July
20,
2011),
available
at
http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=48005&SearchText=
(commenting on the Proposed Rule entitled “Further Definition of ‘Swap,’ ‘Security-Based
Swap,’ and ‘Security-Based Swap Agreement’; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap
Agreement Recordkeeping” (File Number S7-16-11) and arguing that the definition of
“swap” and “security-based swap” should exclude deals with international public
organizations). The European Central Bank (“ECB”) claimed that the ECB and other
foreign central banks would shift swaps activities away from U.S. markets or U.S.
counterparties if not granted an exemption. See Letter from Antonio Sáinz de Vicuña, Eur.
Cent. Bank, to Jacqueline Mesa, Director, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 7 (Oct. 11,
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their international public missions, and the attendant legal protections
thereunder, as a primary basis for excluding them from the jurisdiction of
the Dodd-Frank Act. The analysis that follows reveals the extent to which
assertions of international privileges and immunities may enable
differential regulatory treatment. The malleability of these international
law doctrines has provided substantial discretion to financial regulators to
define the scope and conditions of state-owned financial entities’
obligations.
Prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, the OTC derivatives
market—most notably, the market for swaps transactions—was
predominantly subject only to indirect regulatory oversight.139 The DoddFrank Act transforms the regulation of swaps in a variety of ways. Title
VII of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes a new legal framework for the OTC
derivatives market, including: (i) mandatory clearing of swaps transactions
through central clearing parties and mandatory trading through either
regulated exchanges or swap execution facilities; (ii) requiring the posting
of collateral (“margin”) for certain swaps transactions; (iii) requiring new
categories of market participants—swap dealers and major swap
participants—to register with the CFTC and/or SEC; and (iv) imposing new
recordkeeping and reporting requirements on parties in swaps
transactions.140
The derivatives activities of state-owned financial entities are not
expressly referenced at all in the Dodd-Frank Act. Notably, the DoddFrank Act exempts the Federal Reserve from all regulation under Title VII
while remaining silent about the treatment of foreign central banks and
other state-owned financial entities with similar functions.141 In response to
2011), available at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/View
Comment.aspx?id=49816&SearchText= (commenting on Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act
and expressing concern that the ECB may fall under the definition of a major swap
participant and thus become subject to regulation). See also Matt Cameron and Peter
Madigan, ECB Threatens to Stop Trading Swaps with US Banks, RISK MAG., Nov. 2011, at
10 (noting the possibility that the ECB might end trading derivatives with U.S. markets if
they are not given exemptions from Dodd-Frank Act regulations).
139. See Chander & Costa, supra note 74, at 658-61. An example of indirect regulation
was the public disclosure of certain bilateral swaps contracts pursuant to mandatory
reporting requirements under the Exchange Act; however, swaps trades were not subject to
registration, risk provisioning, or capital requirements in the United States.
140. See Dodd-Frank Act §§ 711-754; see also Dan Awrey, Regulating Financial
Innovation: A More Principles-Based Proposal?, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 273,
299-303 (2011) (providing an overview of the objectives and proposed methods of
regulating OTC derivatives markets under the Dodd-Frank Act). Other major aspects of
Title VII include bolstering the authority of federal regulators to prosecute market abuses
and requiring banks to “push-out” many swap activities to affiliates.
141. The Dodd-Frank Act excludes from the definition of swap “any agreement,
contract, or transaction a counterparty of which is a Federal Reserve bank, the Federal
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the resulting uncertainty, IFIs have engaged directly with the CFTC and
SEC, the two federal agencies entrusted with the responsibility of enacting
the rules that would clarify the scope of Title VII’s mandate and provide
operational details on its implementation.142
IFIs have expressed concerns about the implications of the DoddFrank Act on their derivatives activities in several respects:
First, IFIs have sought assurances that federal regulators will not
categorize them as swap dealers or major swap participants, which would
require IFIs to register with the CFTC and/or SEC and subject them to
mandatory clearing and enhanced reporting and recordkeeping
requirements, among other obligations.143
Second, IFIs have flagged the Dodd-Frank Act’s clearing rules, which
require that a swap transaction as a general rule be cleared through a
clearinghouse.144 An exemption to clearing is available to any swap
counterparty that is a non-financial end-user (i.e., not a swap dealer or a
major swap participant) and uses swaps to hedge or mitigate commercial
risk.145 Therefore, under a plain language interpretation of the Dodd-Frank
Act, an end-user that does not meet these requirements—such as a financial
entity (as defined by the Dodd-Frank Act)—would be required to clear its
swaps.
Third, IFIs have objected to being subject to margin requirements—
i.e., being required by law to post collateral with swaps counterparties.146
Government, or a Federal agency that is expressly backed by the full faith and credit of the
United States.” Dodd-Frank Act § 721 (47)(B)(ix).
142. See Deborah Solomon, U.S. Regulators Aim to Extend Reach, WALL ST. J., May
26, 2011 (explaining how U.S. regulators may impose restrictions on foreign governments
engaging in financial transactions in the United States).
143. See Letter from Anne-Marie Leroy, Int’l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev. et al.,
to David A. Stawick, Sec’y, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 2-3 (Sept. 14, 2012),
available at http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments
/ViewComment.aspx?id=58958&SearchText= [hereinafter World Bank September 2012
Comment Letter] (commenting on the Proposed Rule entitled “Margin Requirements for
Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants” and both acknowledging
and welcoming the CFTC’s decision not to require multilateral development banks to
register as swap dealers or major swap participants).
144. See id. at 3 (acknowledging and welcoming the CFTC’s decision not to subject
multilateral development banks to swap clearing requirements).
145. See Dodd-Frank Act § 723 (setting forth an exception to mandatory clearing for
any swap in which one of the counterparties: “(i) is not a financial entity; (ii) is using swaps
to hedge or mitigate commercial risk; and (iii) notifies the Commission, in a manner set
forth by the Commission, how it generally meets its financial obligations associated with
entering into noncleared swaps”).
146. A party entering into a swap faces rate or market risk (e.g., interest rate risk and
currency risk) and counterparty credit risk. When rates move against a party, the party is
said to be “out of the money.” Conversely, when rates move in favor of a party, that party is
said to be “in the money.” Requiring a party that is out of the money to post collateral
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Traditionally, IFIs, like their sovereign counterparts, have only agreed to
receive collateral from swaps counterparties, not post collateral against
swaps exposures.147
Finally, aside from the above-described concerns, IFIs have raised the
possibility of residual and indirect regulation, even if IFIs are exempted
from specific requirements.148
In their engagement with financial regulators, IFIs have employed a
dual-pronged approach premised on their legally-defined missions and
immunities under federal law and international treaties with the United
States. First, IFIs have steadfastly cited the intergovernmental immunity
set forth in their respective constitutive agreements, taking particular note
of the prior practice of the United States to grant generally unqualified
deference.149 While not explicitly referencing the functional necessity
reduces market risk to the other party. SCOTT & GELPERN, supra note 9, at 966, 969.
147. See Letter from Anne-Marie Leroy, Int’l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev. et al.,
to David A. Stawick, Sec’y, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n (Nov. 26, 2012),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2012/November/20121130/R-1415/R1415_112612_110877_688136176592_1.pdf [hereinafter World Bank November 2012
Comment Letter] (commenting on the Proposed Rule entitled “Margin and Capital
Requirements for Covered Swap Entities” and seeking exemption from margin requirements
on uncleared swaps entered into by multilateral development banks); see also David
Rothnie, Difficult Journey, INT’L FIN. REV., Apr. 2012, at 10-12 (noting the historical
reluctance of sovereigns and IFIs to posting collateral relating to swaps).
148. The World Bank, writing on behalf of itself and other multilateral development
banks, argued that only “a comprehensive solution” would preclude the possibility of
various forms of residual and indirect regulation, and proposed that the term “swap” be
defined to exclude transactions with such institutions, thereby completely exempting them
from the Dodd-Frank Act’s requirements. See Letter from Vincenzo La Via, Int’l Bank for
Reconstruction and Dev. et al., to David A. Stawick, Sec’y, Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n
6-8,
attachment
2
(July
22,
2011),
available
at
http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=47911&SearchText=
[hereinafter World Bank July 2011 Comment Letter] (commenting on the Proposed Rule
entitled “Further Definition of ‘Swap,’ ‘Security-Based Swap,’ and ‘Security-Based Swap
Agreement’; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping” (File Number
S7-16-11)).
149. See id. at 2-5 (referring to “well-settled United States legislation” and the EU’s
“consistent record of regulatory forbearance”); World Bank November 2012 Comment
Letter, supra note 147, at 4-5 (referring to a legal opinion requested by, and provided to, the
Chairman of the CFTC that concluded regulation of IBRD and IFC would constitute a
breach by the United States of its international obligations and that the Dodd-Frank Act does
not authorize any curtailment of those institutions’ intergovernmental immunity); Letter
from Soren Elbech, Treasurer, Inter-American Dev. Bank, and J. James Spinner, General
Counsel, Inter-American Dev. Bank, to David A. Stawick, Sec’y, Commodity Futures
Trading
Comm’n
(July
22,
2011),
available
at
http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=47925&SearchText=;
Letter from Isabelle Laurent, Deputy Treasurer and Head of Funding, European Bank for
Reconstruction and Dev., to Jacqueline Hamra Mesa, Dir., Office of Internal Affairs,
Commodity
Futures
Trading
Comm’n
(July
22,
2011),
available
at
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doctrine, IFIs have pointedly emphasized the importance of their
derivatives activities to the fulfillment of their institutional mandates.150
Second, IFIs have emphasized their political uniqueness, as reflected in
their legally-defined international public missions and collective
governance structures.151
The arguments advanced by IFIs have a broader application to the
concerns regarding extraterritorial regulation shared with other state-owned
financial entities. The difficulty of relying on territoriality as a threshold
principle is underscored by the fact that several IFIs and numerous other
international organizations are headquartered in the United States.152 The
World Bank, on behalf of itself and other international organizations, has
consistently taken the position that it is not a U.S. person due to its legal
character as an international organization and the offshore nature of its
development activities.153 Further, IFIs have justified their use of swaps
based on their intended purpose to hedge currency, interest rate, and other
market risks arising from their lending, borrowing, equity management,
and investment operations.154 Accordingly, IFIs argue that the regulation of
their relatively low-risk hedging activities should be considered to be
outside the scope of the Dodd-Frank Act and therefore left unregulated.155
The CFTC, as the primary regulator of IFIs’ swaps activities, has
largely embraced the positions advanced by IFIs in applicable rulemaking
http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewExParte.aspx?id=314&SearchText=.
150. See World Bank July 2011 Comment Letter, supra note 148, at 8 (stating that
“[t]he use of derivatives for risk management purposes is integral to the development
operations of the IBRD, IFC, and other MDBs”).
151. See id. at 6 (describing the management of IBRD and IFC by their respective
sovereign shareholders, including the United States, and the direct oversight authority of
their respective boards and audit committees over financial operations); World Bank
September 2012 Comment Letter, supra note 143, at 6-7 (describing how margin
requirements would impair the development effectiveness of multilateral development
banks).
152. Among such entities are the World Bank, the IMF, the IDB, and the United
Nations.
153. See World Bank July 2011 Comment Letter, supra note 148, at 4. See also Letter
from Kenneth E. Bentsen, Jr., Exec. Vice President, Public Policy and Advocacy, Sec.
Indus. and Fin. Markets Ass’n, to David A. Stawick, Sec’y, Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n
(Aug.
27,
2012),
available
at
http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.aspx?id=58652&SearchText=
(recommending that the CFTC exclude supranational organizations from the definition of
U.S. person in order to “promote international comity and harmonization of international
swap regulation”) [hereinafter SIFMA Comment Letter].
154. See World Bank July 2011 Comment Letter, supra note 148, attachment 1
(describing how multilateral development banks use swaps).
155. See World Bank September 2012 Comment Letter, supra note 143, at 5-6
(claiming that the imposition of margin requirements would be inconsistent with the
CFTC’s statutory mandate and would serve no policy purpose).
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to date. In exempting IFIs from registration as swap dealers or major swap
participants, the CFTC determined:
[T]he sovereign or international status of foreign governments,
foreign central banks and international financial institutions that
themselves participate in the swap markets in a commercial
manner is relevant in determining whether such entities are
subject to registration and regulation as a major swap participant
or swap dealer. Canons of statutory construction “assume that
legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of
other nations when they write American laws.” There is nothing
in the text or history of the swap-related provisions of Title VII to
establish that Congress intended to deviate from the traditions of
the international system by including foreign governments,
foreign central banks and international financial institutions
within the definitions of the terms “swap dealer” or “major swap
participant,” thereby requiring that they affirmatively register as
swap dealers or major swap participants with the CFTC and be
regulated as such. The CFTC does not believe that foreign
governments, foreign central banks and international financial
institutions should be required to register as swap dealers or
major swap participants.156
Relying on similar reasoning and expressly citing international comity
and the “traditions of the international system”, the CFTC has also
exempted foreign governments, foreign central banks, and IFIs from the
Dodd-Frank Act’s clearing requirements.157 However, the CFTC refrained
from applying a blanket regulatory exemption to IFIs’ swaps activities,
choosing not to accept the World Bank’s initial proposal.158 Rules
addressing the treatment of IFIs in respect of any applicable margin
requirements for uncleared swaps remain pending.159
156. Further Definition of “Swap Dealer,” “Security-Based Swap Dealer,” “Major Swap
Participant,” “Major Security-Based Swap Participant” and “Eligible Contract Participant,”
77 Fed. Reg. 30,596, 30,693 (May 23, 2012) (internal citations omitted).
157. End-User Exception to the Clearing Requirement for Swaps, 77 Fed. Reg. 42,560,
42,562 (July 19, 2012).
158. A complete carve-out for foreign and multinational public entities on the basis of
international privileges and immunities appeared to be viewed as a viable option by at least
one CFTC Commissioner during the rulemaking process. See Further Definition of “Swap,”
“Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; SecurityBased Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, Statement of CFTC Commissioner Jill Sommers
re: Transactions Involving Certain Foreign or Multinational Entities, 76 Fed. Reg. 29,818,
29,899-900 (proposed May 23, 2011) (advocating for the preservation of international
privileges and immunities for multinational public organizations in order to avoid hindering
their operational effectiveness).
159. See Margin Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap
Participants, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,732 (proposed Apr. 28, 2011); Margin and Capital
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III. GLOBAL FINANCIAL REGULATION AS COMITY
Claims of freedom from the regulatory authority of a government
highlight the potential for conflict arising from the juxtaposition of two
complementary legal concepts: national sovereignty and international
privileges and immunities. The special treatment of state-owned financial
entities due to their sovereign status casts in high relief the unique friction
points in the governance of the global economy, in which there is no
unified meta-sovereign rulemaking and enforcement authority. This is
certainly evident in derivatives regulation. The implementation of
mandatory rules governing swaps transactions constitutes an abrupt
transformation in a heretofore largely unregulated area. As apparent in the
CFTC’s rulemaking concerning foreign central banks and IFIs, the
application of international privileges and immunities is marked by an
ambiguously-defined compromise between market equality and sovereign
prerogative.
A. The Systemic Legitimacy of State-Owned Financial Entities
International privileges and immunities, as applied by domestic
financial regulators, are justified on the very terms on which they were
created: to respect international comity by preserving the authority of each
state to govern within its own borders and in respect of its own subjects.160
Similarly, the intergovernmental immunity afforded to international
organizations reflects the exclusive nature and purpose of their activities,
which may be viewed as express and implicit delegations of sovereign
authority by their respective member states.161 A key distinction between
international organizations and their state counterparts is the doctrine of
functional necessity, reflected in the absence of a commercial activity
exception to intergovernmental immunity.162 In comparison to sovereign
Requirements for Covered Entities, 76 Fed. Reg. 27,564 (proposed May 11, 2011). See also
Semiannual Agenda of Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,394, 44,394 (July 23, 2013) (noting the
re-opening of the comment period on proposed rules regarding margin and capital
requirements for covered swap entities); 78 Fed. Reg. 43,785, 43,794 n.63 (noting that the
CFTC has not yet finalized these rules).
160. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Changing the International Law of Sovereign Immunity
Through National Decisions, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1185, 1187 (2011) (noting and
critiquing references to comity in Supreme Court decisions addressing sovereign immunity).
161. See Singer, supra note 121, at 127; see also Martha, supra note 132, at 97
(characterizing IFIs as “providers of international public goods” that its member states have
determined cannot be provided by themselves).
162. Domestic regulators that are not accustomed to parsing the doctrinal subtleties of
international privileges and immunities may blur this distinction. In determining that IFIs
were not required to register as swap dealers or major swap participants, it appears that the
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immunity, the more absolute approach of intergovernmental immunity may
be justified by the fact that IFIs, notwithstanding their considerable capital
assets and broad economic mandates, lack the territorial sovereignty
enjoyed by states and have more limited means of enforcing international
legal commitments through extrajudicial means.163
These legal entitlements have prescriptive and normative implications
for global financial regulation. First, governance gaps may arise if
conflicts between extraterritorial regulation and international privileges and
immunities are resolved differently across jurisdictions. On the one hand,
it may be argued that the regulatory diversity resulting from differential
treatment of such institutions may be desirable insofar as it implicitly
enables cost-benefit analysis of extraterritorial jurisdiction based on
regulatory priorities.164 On the other hand, however, such gaps may be
suboptimal in other respects. One possibility is that regulatory diversity
may lead to uncertainty among private market participants and other
regulators about the future treatment of state-owned financial entities.165
Second, even if there is regulatory consistency across jurisdictions, the
discretionary regulation of state-owned financial entities may perpetuate
doubts about the legitimacy of global financial regulation.166 The challenge
of legitimacy applies generally to any global governance regime in which
there is a tension between the accountability of domestic regulators to their
own citizenry and their accountability to foreign regulatory counterparts.167
The issue of systemic legitimacy is most apparent in respect of the dualfaced roles of foreign central banks and IFIs, which operate as market
CFTC implied that the intergovernmental immunity granted to IFIs is qualified by the
commercial activity exception based on the restrictive approach to immunity. See 77 Fed.
Reg. at 30,693. The World Bank subsequently requested clarification and a correction on
this point. See World Bank September 2012 Comment Letter, supra note 142, attachment 3.
163. See Brower, supra note 120, at 16-17 (analyzing the motivations for and
complications arising from the application of sovereign immunity concepts to international
organizations).
164. See José E. Alvarez, The Return of the State, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 223, 258 (2011)
(observing that fragmented global governance may reflect forum-shifting/forum-shopping
by empowered states to serve their own interests); Harlan Grant Cohen, Finding
International Law, Part II: Our Fragmenting Legal Community, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 1049, 1103–06 (2012) (outlining a “competition/politics” response to fragmentation).
165. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Mutual Recognition in International Finance, 52
HARV. INT’L L.J. 55, 68 (2011) (noting the considerable uncertainty states face in respect of
each other’s regulatory systems).
166. See BRUMMER, supra note 28, at 330-32 (describing the particularly problematic
legitimacy of global financial regulation in comparison to purely domestic regulation).
167. See Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition
Regimes: Governance Without Global Government, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 26768 (Summer/Autumn 2005) (noting the effect of state recognition of external policies on the
domestic policies of those states).
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participants and also function as regulatory supervisors and advisers in the
international financial architecture. The granting of regulatory immunity to
such state-owned financial entities may therefore raise unique legitimacy
questions. The effectiveness of central banks and IFIs in projecting state
regulatory power is premised on perceptions of their legitimacy.168
Legitimacy criteria fall under two broad categories: input legitimacy and
output legitimacy. Input legitimacy focuses on the means of lawmaking
and considers whether the lawmaking process is representative and
procedurally fair.169 Output legitimacy focuses on the content of laws and
considers whether the laws themselves meet a normative standard based on
what is deemed to be right, acceptable, desired, or just.170 The malleability
of international privileges and immunities in respect of extraterritorial
regulation offers the advantages of ad hoc lawmaking to a unique class of
market participants. From an output legitimacy perspective, however, the
possibility of being granted regulatory immunity may incentivize
inefficient, rent-seeking behavior by state-owned financial entities based on
selective assertions of international privileges and immunities and the
structuring of their market activities to permit maximum use of such
privileges and immunities.171 From an input legitimacy perspective, the
domestically-driven administrative law process of determining the scope of
regulatory immunity may lack sufficient constructive visibility
commensurate with the global scope of the resulting substantive rules.172

168. See Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L.
705, 706 (1988) (defining legitimacy as the “quality of a rule which derives from a
perception on the part of those to whom it is addressed that it has come into being in
accordance with right process”) (italics removed). See also Dana Brakman Reiser & Claire
R. Kelly, Linking NGO Legitimacy and the Legitimacy of Global Governance, 36 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 1011, 1014-15 (2011) (describing legitimacy as “socially constructed”).
169. See BRUMMER, supra note 28, at 323 (noting the importance of democratic
processes to input legitimacy); Claire R. Kelly, Institutional Alliances and Derivative
Legitimacy, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 605, 608, 614-19 (2008) (describing the importance of
representation and other features in establishing input legitimacy).
170. See Kelly, supra note 169, at 608, 619-22 (describing the features that create
results-based output legitimacy).
171. See José E. Alvarez, Governing the World: International Organizations as
Lawmakers, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 591, 598 (2008) (observing that the conduct
of international organizations has normative consequences independent from the authority
delegated to them by states).
172. See Caroline Bradley, Consultation and Legitimacy in Transnational StandardSetting, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 480, 501 (2011) (noting the importance of broad-based
visibility of regulatory consultation processes to the perceived legitimacy of their ends);
Pierre-Hugues Verdier, U.S. Implementation of Basel II: Lessons for Informal International
Lawmaking, in INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 437, 438-39 (Joost Pauwelyn et al.
eds., 2012) (noting the limitations of domestic implementation as a means of addressing
external accountability to other countries and their banks, firms, and consumers).
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Even if domestic administrative lawmaking concerning international
privileges and immunities is carried out in accordance with public
participatory principles, such as the “notice-and-comment” procedures
required by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the legitimizing
process may be too attenuated from the stakeholders that may be affected
by it.173 Further, the legitimacy of central banks and IFIs may be adversely
impacted by disagreement or inconsistency among private market
participants about the scope of the special treatment granted to them.174
The doctrinal indeterminacy of regulatory immunity—reflected in goodfaith differences of opinion among subjects of extraterritorial regulation—
may undermine the compliance “pull” of the broader set of rules that
compose global financial regulation.175 The broad-based regulatory and
supervisory powers of states and international organizations may be
consequently compromised by doubts about their ability to engage with
stakeholders as an “honest broker”.176
B.

Principles of Global Financial Comity

International privileges and immunities are at once too blunt and too
inchoate to address considerations of comity, national sovereignty, and
systemic legitimacy in global financial regulation. In their current form,
the blanket application of these doctrines is not conducive to a holistic,

173. See BRUMMER, supra note 28, at 331 (noting the legitimating function of domestic
political participation in the lawmaking process).
174. For example, in the context of the Dodd-Frank Act’s regulation of derivatives, this
is arguably evident in comments from SIFMA and ISDA, two prominent industry
associations, concerning the application of margin requirements to foreign central banks and
IFIs. Compare Letter from Robert Pickel, CEO, Int’l Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n, et al., to
David A. Stawick, Sec’y, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 6-7 (Sept. 14, 2012),
available
at
http://www2.isda.org/attachment/NDc5Nw==/ISDA-SIFMACFTCMarginCommentLetter091412.pdf (commenting on CFTC RIN 3038-AC97 - Margin
Requirements for Uncleared Swaps for Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants and
qualifiedly supporting the exemption of sovereigns, central banks, and IFIs from margin
requirements for non-cleared swaps), with Letter from Robert Pickel, CEO, Int’l Swaps and
Derivatives Ass’n, to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, et al. 10-11 (Nov. 26,
2012),
available
at
http://www2.isda.org/attachment/NTEwMA==/Margin%20for%20Uncleared%20Letter.pdf
(commenting on the proposed rulemaking regarding Margin and Capital Requirements for
Covered Swap Entities, and stating “that all sovereigns and central banks should post
margin in order to achieve international comity”).
175. See Franck, supra note 168, at 713-25 (discussing how different factors of
determinacy affect the legitimacy of rules).
176. See Kelly, supra note 169, at 625-26 (observing that the effectiveness of
international organizations depends in part on their perceived responsiveness to the demands
of civil society and the interests that they represent).
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transparent assessment of the diverse situations in which state-owned
financial entities participate in global financial markets. Given a regulatory
environment in which private market participants are subject to
increasingly far-reaching regulatory oversight, it stands to reason that there
may be countervailing factors warranting the extension of these
requirements to their public counterparts. Further thereto, it has been
suggested that certain government instrumentalities and international
organizations should be regulated as international legal persons, with the
attendant rights and obligations of multinational corporations and other
private actors.177
This goes too far.
Notwithstanding the legitimacy concerns
implicated by their application, international privileges and immunities
do—and, moreover, should—remain salient. In the context of the global
financial system, these privileges and immunities formalize the unique
public missions and public governance of the state-owned financial entities
that enjoy them. More than simply permitting such public entities to
participate in the financial markets, these doctrines provide the
predictability and stability necessary to incentivize and empower them to
act in the best interests of their shareholders (i.e., states and their citizens)
in their dual capacities as regulators and market participants. The
shortcomings of international privileges and immunities are a symptom of
the conceptual limitations of international law to address the complexities
caused by the convergence of public and private law, rather than a cause.178
Comity as a means of allocating regulatory authority is hampered by
the increasingly diffuse, decentralized structure of the international
financial architecture.179 Thus, the fundamental question is how to
operationalize the principles of comity on which international privileges
and immunities are based. A framework for global financial comity is one
response. Its normative principles address two interrelated concerns
implicated by the presence of state-owned financial entities in the market:
first, by calibrating the role of the state in fragmented, multilayered global
governance regimes and second, by contextualizing the distinction between
public and private legal responsibility. First, global financial comity takes
into account the interdependence of the state’s responsibilities as a
regulator and its rights as a market participant. By calibrating their own

177. See Alvarez, supra note 171, at 610 (noting the work of the U.N. International Law
Commission to delineate the responsibility of international organizations with legal
liability).
178. See Backer, supra note 97, at 499-500.
179. See Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 VA. J.
INT’L L. 1, 56-57 (2001) (observing that the effectiveness of comity may be dependent on
the size of the group).
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authority to regulate extraterritorially on the willingness to apply the same
process of lawmaking (but not necessarily the same rules or substantive
outcomes) to their own state-owned financial entities, states and their
intergovernmental agents enhance the legitimacy of their actions.180 This
process of norm internalization requires states to recognize the benefits of
engaging with multiple regulators across regulatory regimes.181 Second,
global financial comity permits a more nuanced, context-specific
conception of public and private domains in international law. A pluralistic
approach to regulation more accurately reflects the dynamic, fluid
relationships of global finance.182 Instead of invoking the principle of
comity without substantive context, extraterritorial regulation and
exceptions thereto (whether based on international privileges and
immunities or on any other grounds in respect of any party, public or
private) would rely on normative persuasion, cost-benefit analysis, or other
metrics deemed appropriate.183 Embracing the inherently political nature of
global financial regulation would be another consequence.
By
“foregrounding” the political dynamics that underlie assertions of
extraterritorial regulatory authority and international privileges and
immunities, regulators and market participants may be able to engage in a
more transparent dialogue regarding their intentions and constraints.184
There are a variety of institutional mechanisms through which global
financial comity could be carried out. The Dodd-Frank Act includes
numerous mandates requiring administrative agencies to consult and

180. See Parrish, supra note 33, at 870 (arguing that international norms and procedures
in lieu of extraterritoriality enhance, rather than detract from, state power by legitimizing a
state’s meta-objectives).
181. See Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federal Rules to Intersystemic Governance in
Securities Regulation, 57 EMORY L.J. 233, 240-44 (2007) (describing the importance of
coordination and regulatory persuasion, instead of hierarchical regulatory control). See also
Abbott & Snidal, supra note 68, at 573-77 (describing the potential role of states and
international organizations as facilitative orchestrators).
182. See Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 523 (2005) (characterizing the distinction between state
policy and private agreement as “always problematic . . . [and] increasingly irrelevant”).
183. See Paul Schiff Berman, A Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 YALE J.
INT’L L. 301, 318-20 (2007) (noting the importance of the mutual benefits underlying
comity); Ming-Sung Kuo, Inter-Public Legality or Post-Public Legitimacy? Global
Governance and the Curious Case of Global Administrative Law as a New Paradigm of
Law, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1050, 1073-74 (2012) (noting the primacy of public dialogue on
the legitimacy of law within extralegal politics).
184. See David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, in RULING THE WORLD?
CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 37, 57-60 (Jeffrey L.
Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009) (noting the dangers of disregarding the distributive
effects of politics on global governance lawmaking).
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coordinate with their foreign regulatory counterparts.185 Instead of solely
viewing these mechanisms as a means of coordinating and enforcing
regulatory action, regulators may be able to use them to facilitate
constructive dialogue with market participants on a global scale.186
Administrative law procedures in different jurisdictions could be expanded
to promote dialogue among a broader group of stakeholders, including
domestic regulators, international organizations, and various non-state
actors.187 Specifically with respect to the assertion of international
privileges and immunities, these coordinating mechanisms would provide a
forum for state-owned financial entities to express their interests, recognize
conflicting policy objectives, and prescribe shared fundamental values to
guide regulation.188
The Financial Stability Board established by the G20 may be one
appropriate forum for the promulgation of the rules and objectives for such
institutional dialogue. Towards that end, an international administrative
law agency with enforcement powers could serve as an institutional forum
for the identification of interests and resolution of disputes.189 Granted, it is
unlikely that state-owned financial entities would be willing to voluntarily
cede autonomy over their operational practices to an autonomous
international body.190 Alternatively, domestic administrative lawmaking
processes could institutionalize and formalize existing modes of input.
These modes of input would grant deference to foreign rulemaking as
185. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act requires the CFTC, the SEC, and prudential
regulators to “consult and coordinate with foreign regulatory authorities on the
establishment of consistent international standards with respect to the regulation (including
fees) of swaps . . . and may agree to such information-sharing arrangements as may be
deemed to be necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors
[and] swap counterparties.” Dodd-Frank Act § 752(a).
186. The effectiveness of social acculturation is premised on the interactions among
regulators and market participants leading to greater cooperation, coordination, and
compliance. See Verdier, supra note 71, 164-65, 171 (noting the need for more detailed
empirical analysis in the context of transgovernmental regulatory networks).
187. See Reiser & Kelly, supra note 168, at 1016-17; see also Benedict Kingsbury, Nico
Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 33 (Summer/Autumn 2005) (approvingly noting the use of noticeand-comment procedures in the United States that take into account international
negotiations among regulators).
188. See Weber, supra note 66, at 692-94 (arguing for the development and
identification of common core values for establishing a system of multilayered governance).
189. See Pan, supra note 15, at 280 (noting the dispute settlement powers of the
European System of Financial Supervisors).
190. Notwithstanding, in this respect, the Santiago Principles concerning the disclosure
and corporate governance practices of SWFs could arguably be distinguished from the
financial activities of central banks and IFIs insofar as the diversity of SWF practices and
the relatively new and unsettled nature of SWFs’ equity investments may incentivize SWF
states to agree to a voluntary code of conduct.
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referenced by third party private market participants.191 Similarly, legally
non-binding standards set forth by transgovernmental regulatory networks
pursuant to notice-and-comment procedures may be used as an additional
reference point.192
In all of these instances, state-owned financial entities would retain a
rebuttable presumption of legality that would be conditioned on identifying
a reasonable public basis for their market activities and applying any
available international privileges and immunities to the extent necessary for
such entities to carry out these expressed public objectives.193 Although
this procedural framework does not dictate the adoption of particular
substantive rules, it would suggest a shift away from formalist rulemaking
towards functionalist approaches to conflicts between extraterritorial
regulation and national sovereignty. For example, the adoption of a
“purpose” based test for determining whether financial activities of a
sovereign entity constitute “commercial activity” would provide a means

191. For example, private market participants have expressly cited the anti-competitive
impact of divergent treatment by U.S. and EU regulators in respect of derivatives regulation:
[T]he imposition of margin requirements on foreign sovereigns would have a
serious anti-competitive impact on U.S. swap entities in relation to their foreign
competitors. Assuming non-U.S. jurisdictions create margin rules, foreign
regulators are unlikely to apply onerous margin requirements to transactions
with their sovereign. Recent discussions within Europe indicate a difference
between the European Union (“E.U.”) approach and the U.S. approach. For
example, in a recent letter from the senior officials of the European Central
Bank (“ECB”) to the CFTC and the SEC, the ECB asks the Commissions to
exclude from the definition of “swap” and “security-based swap” any
agreement, contract, or transaction in which one counterparty is a public
international organization, such as the ECB, or a national central bank of a
market economy. If the E.U. excludes such entities from its margin
requirements while the U.S. margin rules capture such entities, U.S. swap
entities will be placed at a severe disadvantage in competing for the business of
sovereign counterparties.
Letter from Robert Pickel, CEO, Int’l Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n, to the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, et al. 12 (July 6, 2011) available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2011/November/20111122/R-1415/R1415_070611_81727_628897276954_1.pdf (commenting regarding Margin and Capital
Requirements for Covered Swap Entities).
192. In respect of the applicability of derivatives regulation to sovereign and
supranational entities, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and IOSCO have
determined, after requesting comments on a prior draft report, that sovereigns, central banks,
multilateral development banks, and BIS should not be required to collect or post margin.
See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION AND BOARD OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS, Second Consultative Document, Margin
Requirements for Non-Centrally Cleared Derivatives 7 (Feb. 2013), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs242.pdf.
193. See Buxbaum, supra note 34, at 307-08 (identifying the importance of state consent
in transnational economic regimes).
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for explaining, justifying, and contextualizing the financial activity in
question.194 In respect of derivatives regulation, the CFTC has articulated a
principle that expressly distinguishes SWFs from other foreign state-owned
financial entities due to the different nature of their respective commercial
activities.195 The European Union has followed a substantively similar—
but not identical—approach, independent of the Dodd-Frank Act
rulemaking process, under derivatives rules promulgated by the European
Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR).196
Another regulatory technique to institutionalize global financial
comity is through mutual recognition regimes. Mutual recognition
circumscribes the application of extraterritorial regulation by allowing
regulators to recognize another jurisdiction’s standards as an adequate
substitute, if not functionally equivalent. Accordingly, foreign firms or
activities that comply with their home state’s regulation may be exempted
from compliance with the host state’s regulatory requirements.197 One of
the primary benefits of mutual recognition is to facilitate recognition of the
benefits of integration and promote dialogue among disparate market actors
regarding substantive goals, without requiring substantive harmonization of
two or more countries’ laws.198 In contrast to extraterritorial regulation of
global economic activity based on the unilateral projection of domestic law,
mutual recognition consists of extraterritorial lawmaking premised on the
intermingling of multiple domestic laws to constitute the global.199 Of
particular note, U.S. financial regulators are currently exploring a variant of
mutual recognition through the concept of “substituted compliance.”200
194. See HLR Note, supra note 83, at 568-69 (endorsing the use of a “sovereign
purpose” test); Gaukrodger, supra note 112, at 52-53 (noting the importance of the type of
foreign state entity for purposes of determining whether it should be entitled to regulatory
immunity).
195. To cite one example, the CFTC determined that “registration and regulation as a
swap dealer or major swap participant under such circumstances may be warranted . . . for
foreign corporate entities and sovereign wealth funds, which act in the market in the same
manner as private asset managers.” 77 Fed. Reg. at 30,693. See also Gaukrodger, supra
note 112, at 53 (identifying “clearly commercial acts” as a basis for precluding regulatory
immunity).
196. EMIR exempts multilateral development banks and any other entities that are both
owned by central governments and have explicit central government guarantees from its
jurisdiction, with the exception of certain reporting obligations. See Regulation on OTC
Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories, Regulation (EU) No 646/2012,
July
4,
2012,
art.
I(5)(a),
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:201:0001:0059:EN:PDF.
197. Verdier, supra note 165, at 57.
198. See id. at 65-66; Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV.
1155, 1124 (2007).
199. See Nicolaidis & Shaffer, supra note 167, at 266-68.
200. See 78 Fed. Reg. at 43,786 (determining that the CFTC’s implementation of
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Under this regime, a foreign financial entity would be permitted to
substitute compliance with its home state’s derivatives rules (in lieu of the
requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act to which it would otherwise be
subject) so long as the foreign home state’s regulatory requirements, in the
view of the appropriate U.S. financial regulator, are deemed to be
comparable.201 The inclusion of state-owned financial entities in this
regime, which could take into account the unique public supervisory
oversight to which their activities are subject, would enhance the systemic
legitimacy of global financial regulation.
CONCLUSION: SOVEREIGNTY AND THE GLOBAL MARKET
This Article is intended to be both interstitial and universal in focus.
By examining the cross-border regulation of state-owned financial entities,
it seeks to identify and clarify the legal issues applicable to an important
class of actors in global financial markets. In the process, this Article seeks
to highlight the paramount importance of legitimacy to global financial
regulation and to shed light on how legitimacy claims are subject to the
means by which regulatory authority is exercised as well as to the legal
entitlements of market participants.
The power to regulate extraterritorially is both a reflection and an
instrument of national sovereignty that defines, augments, and refines state
power. The presence of state-owned financial entities in global financial
markets highlights one of numerous tensions in the relationship between
transnational economic activity and the nation-state. The existence of
international privileges and immunities underscores the importance of
balancing the objectives of extraterritorial regulation with the prerogatives
of central banks and IFIs in their dual capacities as regulators and market
participants. The framework of global financial comity outlined in this
Article attempts to harmonize the doctrines of international privileges and
immunities with the overlapping extraterritorial, decentralized, and
multilayered financial governance regimes of the twenty-first century. A
more refined, pluralistic application of international privileges and
immunities may facilitate the participation of a broader group of private
substituted compliance requires additional time, at least through the end of 2013); see also
CFTC, The European Commission and the CFTC reach a Common Path Forward on
Derivatives,
PR6640-13,
July
11,
2013,
available
at
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6640-13.
201. See 77 Fed. Reg. at 41,232-34 (outlining the process for determining substituted
compliance). One of the premises on which substituted compliance is being considered is
the adoption of regulatory requirements by non-U.S. regulators that are similar to certain
U.S. rules. In other words, the availability of substituted compliance is premised on partial
harmonization. See 78 Fed. Reg. at 878.
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and public market participants, and continue to encourage central banks,
IFIs, and similar state-owned financial entities to apply such tenets to their
own conduct.
Looking more expansively, the principles and objectives of global
financial comity are of potential value to financial regulation generally.
The development, institutionalization, and effectiveness of the current
administrative agency practices described in this Article—such as
consultations between U.S. financial regulators and their foreign
counterparts on parallel rulemaking and the implementation of substituted
compliance under the Dodd-Frank Act—are areas worthy of future
empirical study. This exploration is part of a broader need to examine the
relevance of long-standing legal doctrines, such as international privileges
and immunities, amidst structural changes in the international economy.
The future evolution of global financial regulation requires careful
consideration of how these doctrines are applied in order to ensure that they
protect the legal rights of their holders while not unduly hindering the
development of new governance regimes that may incorporate
transgovernmental regulatory networks, mutual recognition, selfregulation, and public-private partnerships, among other possibilities.

